

A DILEMMA OF WAR:
DECISIVE FORCE VS. FABIAN STRATEGY

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INTRODUCTION

After the Great War, Lawrence of Arabia (T.E. Lawrence) reflected on his view of the ideal military theory. As one might expect, he had been very impressed with Clausewitz's theory before the war. However, during his campaigns in the Middle East, he found the works of Marshal de Saxe more relevant to the problems he faced in the desert. Lawrence said:

Our duty was to attain our end with the greatest economy of life, since life was more precious to us than money or time. If we were patient and superhuman-skilled, we could follow the direction of Saxe and reach victory without battle, by pressing our advantages mathematical and psychological.¹

Lawrence was not a civilian-soldier who was thrust into World War I without preparation. His knowledge of war theory was based on a foundation of extensive reading while at Oxford. While there, he read virtually all the classic war theorists.² However, it would be his experience in combat that would further shape his concept of the ideal military theory.

Early in his campaigns in the desert, Lawrence nearly died from exhaustion. In 1917, Lawrence was forced to lie in his cot for 10 days shortly after receiving a

¹ T.E. Lawrence, *Revolt in the Desert*, (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1927), 66.

² B.H. Liddell Hart, *Colonel Lawrence: The Man Behind the Legend, New and Enlarged Edition*, (New

mission to destroy the Turkish garrison troops at Medina.³ During this time, he sought "an immediate equation between my book reading and our present movements. However, the books gave me the aim of war quite pat, 'the destruction of the organized forces of the enemy' by 'the one process, battle.' Victory could only be purchased by blood." He then came upon the idea that it was useless to capture Medina because it would be too costly and gain little.⁴ He realized that the Arab aim was to occupy all Arabic-speaking land in Asia. They might have to kill Turks, but killing Turks was not the objective. "In the last resort we would be compelled to the desperate course of blood, on the maxim of 'murder' war, but as cheaply as possible for ourselves, since the Arabs were fighting for freedom, a pleasure only to be tasted by a man alive."⁵

Hart cited this revelation as an indication that Lawrence's experiences with real warfare freed him "from the metaphysical spell of Clausewitz" and he "could now appreciate Saxe's practical point of view." Hart believed that Lawrence realized "that Saxe had kept his mind on the ultimate aim of war, to which battle is only a means. Saxe himself had fought several battles, all victories. However, he did not fight battles for battle's sake, like Napoleon and his heirs were inclined to do."⁶ Lawrence then developed a plan based on these ideas which consisted in conducting raids on the Turkish railway⁷ and ultimately in the near bloodless capture of the important

York: Dodd, Mead, & Company, 1935), 128-129.

³ Ibid., 123.

⁴ Ibid., 131.

⁵ Ibid., 132.

⁶ Ibid., 133.

⁷ Ibid., 140.

strategic port city of Aqaba.⁸ The capture of Aqaba was the only good news for the Allies on the Egyptian front in the spring and summer of 1917. Its capture removed the danger posed by the Medina garrison of a raid through the Sinai against the Suez Canal or the British army in Palestine. Losing only one of his 50 men, Lawrence captured the 1,200-man garrison. The British had lost 3,000 men in their previous, unsuccessful attempts.⁹

This historical example poses the question, is such a bloodless military strategy still possible? As we shall discuss, today's followers of Clausewitz would certainly answer in the negative. Some even believe that in the nuclear age, the use of conventional military force is no longer a viable policy option because conventional military preparedness cannot secure national policy objectives or provide for an adequate defense.¹⁰ Nonetheless, recent conventional military operations have clearly shown that the end of armed conflict is not in sight. Therefore, such a strategy could be useful based on its continued relevance. The focus of this work is to analysis the strategy employed by U.S. military forces in order to secure political objectives. I propose that such force may or may not result in battle casualties depending on the type of strategy employed.

However, if such a strategy were still possible, how could we prove it and under what conditions could military commanders hope for such a plan to succeed? My thesis proposes to study recent U.S. conflicts to search for strategic success in war was gained with and without resorting to decisive battle. I have attempted to

⁸ Ibid., 154.

⁹ Ibid., 162.

¹⁰ Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, *War Without Weapons: Non-Violence in National Defense*,

analyze the variables of political leadership, military commanders, casualties, public opinion, and the war outcome (the resulting peace) across these recent U.S. contingency operations unrelated to the Cold War. I will attempt to answer the following specific questions:

- What theoretical foundation can be established in military thought, which outlines the differences between the two strategic approaches?
- Which theoretical approach dominates current American Strategic culture?
- In recent U.S. operations, was strategic success obtained without resorting to massive killing? If not, was a bloodless military strategy possible?
- Under what conditions would such a strategy most likely succeed?
- How did casualties effect public opinion and the resulting peace?

In attempting to formulate an explanation, I will use the method of causal imputation. This means that the explanation needs to be strong enough that alternative explanations are less consistent with the information available and therefore less likely to support my conclusions. Perhaps, the answers to these questions could best be found if we used the techniques involved in the comparative method. Using this method, I will describe important aspects of the bloodless (Fabian) military theory and its antithesis the current decisive force doctrine. By doing so, I hope to invalidate this one element of Clausewitz's general war theory.

First, I will trace the development the contending theoretical approaches in the war theories of Sun Tzu, Fabias, Frederick the Great, Saxe, Liddell Hart, Machiavelli, Montecuccoli, Jomini, and Clausewitz. I will focus on the importance in which they view decisive battle in terms of military strategy. Then, using four case

studies, I will analyze recent, major U.S. military operations in light of this theoretical debate. My goal is to contribute to the understanding of the use of military force in securing political objectives and to present a possible alternative strategy-type, which could reduce casualties and assist in securing a long-term peace at the conclusion of hostilities.

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DECISIVE FORCE AND FABIAN STRATEGY

The roots of military thought can be traced along many lines of commonality. I propose to trace the lines of origination for decisive force and bloodless (Fabian) military strategies from prominent military thinkers. In this chapter, I have cited the relevant elements of their theories, which indicate their preference for one strategy-type or the other. The theorists I selected were highly regarded for their time as having a significant impact on military operations. I have attempted to group these nine major theorists into two differing theoretical groups. In the first group are those who believed that the highest form of military strategy was one which attempts to avoid decisive battle. These theorists indicated a preference toward a bloodless military strategy as the highest form of warfare. The second group contains those theorists who believed decisive battle was the only method, to achieve results in war. In the following chapter, I will trace this trend through to the decisive force doctrine in the U.S. military.

For each theorist, I have included a brief summary of his general theory of warfare so that these relations could be seen in their proper context. When possible, I have outlined a theorist's stance on how casualties relate to their strategy and how they view the best means to achieve a lasting peace. Figure 1 groups the

theorists into their respective dominant strategy preference. The connecting lines represent chronologically the influence that earlier theorists had on later ones. I will first discuss those who advocate a bloodless military strategy and then those who view decisive battle as the best way to achieve results.




Figure 1

Sun Tzu

Sun Tzu (500 BC) wrote *The Art of War*, which is considered to be the oldest book on strategy and military thought still in existence. *The Art of War* continues to be used by the Chinese today and was an inspiration for Mao Tse-tung's *On Protracted Guerrilla Warfare*.¹¹ Sun Tzu's ideas continue to be held in high regard

¹¹ Trevor N. Dupuy, Curt Johnson, and David L. Bongard, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military*

throughout Asia to this day.¹²

Originally, Sun Tzu's writings brought him to the attention of Ho Lu, King of Wu. The King made Sun Tzu general of his army.¹³ Under his command, King Wu's Army defeated all its foes.¹⁴ Sun Tzu expressed the idea that killing in warfare was not necessarily the best goal. He said:

It is better to capture an army than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.¹⁵

He believed that "the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field." He called this "the method of attacking by stratagem."¹⁶ By attempting to wear down his enemy first before attacking, Sun Tzu believed that "the victorious strategist seeks battle after the victory has been won...."¹⁷ He believed that it was fruitless to attack an enemy's strength. On the contrary, Sun Tzu thought the best way to conduct war was "to avoid what is strong... strike what is weak."¹⁸

His reliance on battlefield intelligence and self-awareness is expressed in the often-quoted expression:

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result

Biography, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992), 720.

¹² Thomas R. Phillips, ed., 9

¹³ Ibid., 15.

¹⁴ Ibid., 17.

¹⁵ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, (500 B.C.), in *Roots of Strategy: The 5 Greatest Military Classics of All Time*, ed., Thomas R. Phillips, (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1985), 26.

¹⁶ Ibid., 27.

¹⁷ Ibid., 30.

¹⁸ Ibid., 36.

of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.¹⁹

Sun Tzu believed that it was not enough to simply win in war, but to be “what the ancients called a clever fighter...who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.” In this manner, “he wins his battle by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.”²⁰ Sun Tzu believed that in war, the “great object [should] be victory, not lengthy campaigns.”²¹ He stated, “There is no instance of a country having been benefited from prolonged warfare.”²² Finally, he believed that the indirect method was the most successful in warfare. “In all fighting the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed to secure victory.”²³

Fabius

Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator, Quintas (266-203 BC) was a Roman statesman and general. In 217 BC, during the Second Punic War, he became dictator of Rome after Gaius Flaminius' Roman army was destroyed by the Carthaginian General Hannibal at the battle of Lake Trasimene.²⁴ He developed the strategy that earned him the surname Cunctator (“Delayer”). His strategy was utilized in order to give Rome time to rebuild its military forces by constantly harassing the flanks of the army of the Hannibal. His intent was to avoid a decisive

¹⁹ Ibid., 28.

²⁰ Ibid., 29.

²¹ Ibid., 26.

²² Ibid., 24.

²³ Ibid., 18.

²⁴ Trevor Dupuy, 245.

battle with the Carthaginian invaders.²⁵ This form of warfare has subsequently been given the generic title of Fabian Strategy.²⁶ A Fabian Strategy is sometimes referred to as a bloodless military strategy. The Roman army under Fabius kept to the hills in order to avoid the Carthaginian cavalry. Although Fabius did not achieve a decisive victory, he appeared to be "immune" from defeat and was thus able to maintain the valuable help of his allies while Rome built strength.

However, Fabius' strategy to gain time, also took time to implement. Many Romans criticized Fabius for his "cowardly and unenterprising spirit." This resulted in the appointment of his chief critic Minucius as co-dictator. The Roman Senate passed a resolution requiring the initiation of battle with Hannibal. Subsequently, the Roman people elected a new leader, Varro, to carry out the dictate. Varro hastily moved his army out of camp promising "to attack the enemy wherever and whenever he found him."²⁷ The result, according to Polybius, was 70,000 dead out of an original force of 76,000.²⁸ What would be latter known as the battle of Cannae (216 BC) was a decisive victory for Hannibal and is famous even today as the classic battle of double-envelopment. Less well known is the fact that had Fabius been allowed to remain in power, such a battle would not have been necessary.

Saxe

Maurice de Saxe (1696-1750) is most well known for serving as the French

²⁵ "Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator, Quintus," *Microsoft® Encarta® 97 Encyclopedia*. (Eugene: Microsoft Corporation, 1997).

²⁶ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy, Second Revised Edition*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967), 46.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 48.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 49.

commander in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748).²⁹ He also served in the Great Northern War (1700-1721), the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), and the Austro-Turkish War (1716-1718).³⁰ He was the eldest of 354 acknowledged illegitimate children of Frederick Augustus, King of Poland.³¹ Although I have categorized Saxe in a different group than Machiavelli, it has been acknowledged that he drew heavily upon Machiavelli's works when he composed his work.³²

Saxe was commissioned in the infantry and served with Prince Eugene in the war against the Turks in 1717. In 1720, he moved to France and took command of a French regiment.³³ In warfare between 1733 and 1736, he distinguished himself and was later promoted to Marshal of France.³⁴ From 1745 to 1748 he commanded the French Army in their victory over the Netherlands.³⁵ His famous work *My Reveries Upon the Art of War* was written in 1732 but was not published until 1757, seven years after his death.³⁶ His hypothetical all-arms organization foreshadowed the Napoleonic corps.³⁷ In terms of the art versus science debate, Saxe believed that "All sciences have principles and rules; war has none. The great captains who have written of it give us none."³⁸

²⁹ "Saxe, Maurice, Comte de," in *Microsoft® Encarta® 97 Encyclopedia*, (Eugene: Microsoft Corporation, 1997).

³⁰ Trevor Dupuy, 660-661.

³¹ Phillips, 179.

³² Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed., Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 27.

³³ *Ibid.*, 180.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 181.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 182.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 183.

³⁷ Trevor Dupuy, 661.

³⁸ Marshal Maurice de Saxe, *My Reveries Upon the Art of War*, In *The Art of War*, (1757), in *Roots of*

Unlike Clausewitz, who was a staff officer, Saxe was a commander of troops who seemed to offer hope for a different type of war where bloodless battle was the goal. On the benefit of the so-called bloody battle, Saxe was quite clear on his preferences. He said, "I do not favor pitched battles, especially at the beginning of war, and I am convinced that a skillful general could make war all his life without being forced into one."³⁹ Conducting operations in this manner "is the highest point of perfection and skill in a general."⁴⁰ Along with the importance of knowing how to conduct operations was to know when to commence them. Saxe believed that the one of the highest functions of a commanding general was to know how to employ his army so that "he will not be forced to fight except when he chooses...."⁴¹ By waiting to attack until all preparations were in one's favor, Saxe was advocating that battle should only be waged when success was virtually assured instead of a mere gamble. This is where the superhuman patience that Lawrence talked about was necessary.

It was not that Saxe was against killing the enemy. He of course recognized that killing was a normal aspect of most campaigns. He believed that when the skillful general left nothing to chance, then battle might not be necessary in war.

Saxe said:

I do not mean to say by this that when an opportunity occurs to crush the enemy that he should not be attacked, nor that advantage should not be taken of his mistakes. But I do mean that war can be made without leaving anything to chance.⁴²

Strategy: The 5 Greatest Military Classics of All Time, ed., Thomas R. Phillips, (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1985), 189.

³⁹ Ibid., 298.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 299.

⁴¹ Ibid., 295.

⁴² Ibid., 298.

In fact, Saxe believed that the best method to destroy an enemy's army was through an aggressive pursuit. By doing so, "A detachment of ten thousand men could destroy an army of one hundred thousand in a fight." Such a pursuit should be "pushed to the limit."⁴³ The successful general in such a case "must attack, push, and pursue without cease."⁴⁴ He merely proposed that through superior generalship, a successful strategic situation could be established where victory could be obtained without the need to revert to combat. Such a situation could be achieved through the maneuver of troops in the field and not merely through coercive diplomacy.

Frederick the Great

Frederick II (1712-1786) was the Prussian monarch from 1740-1786. His principal wars were the First Silesian War (1740-1741), the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), and the Seven Years' War (1756-1763). He is recognized as being one of the great captains of history for his ability to defeat armies far larger than his own. His ability to maneuver his forces with great tactical skill was renowned.⁴⁵

Although Frederick was successful in battle, he "was not fond of full-size battles, that is, showdown clashes between the main forces of the belligerents." His reasoning was that this type of warfare relied too much on chance and less on rational calculation. He believed that in a major engagement, the usefulness of a superior plan through intellect was nullified. Frederick thought that generals who

⁴³ Ibid., 299.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 300.

sought this type of engagement did so as “a sign of the sterility of their talents.” The annihilation of an enemy’s military force would not be one of Frederick’s strategic objectives. For Frederick, the purpose of battle was “to compel your opponent to yield you his position.”⁴⁶ Warfare for Frederick was strategically slow, although tactically fast. He said, “To gain many small successes means gradually to heap up a treasure.”⁴⁷

Liddell Hart

Sir B.H. Liddell Hart (1895-1970) was a British Army infantry officer and primarily a military theorist.⁴⁸ He served in the British Army in World War I, reaching the rank of Captain. He was medically retired after the war due to injuries he received in a gas attack during the Battle of the Somme. However, some critics believe that it was his individualism, which caused him to retire.⁴⁹ As a civilian, he worked as a journalist on military affairs and wrote numerous books on military theory and strategy.

In his classic book *Strategy*, Hart surveyed all the major campaigns in the Western World in the last 25 centuries. After careful study, he developed a strategic theory, which purported to explain success in all manners of warfare. He found one critical, consistent variable. Hart stated:

Throughout the ages, effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent’s unreadiness to meet it. The indirectness has usually been

⁴⁵ Trevor Dupuy, 259.

⁴⁶ R. R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed., Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 103.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 104.

⁴⁸ Trevor Dupuy, 445.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 445.

physical, and always psychological.⁵⁰

This is not to say that such an approach was common. On the contrary, Hart said that "the direct approach has been normal, and a purposeful indirect approach the exception."⁵¹ He believed that instead of "seeking to upset the enemy's equilibrium by one's attack, it must be upset before a real attack is or can be successfully launched." Hart even gives credit to Hitler for his interest in the same subject. He quotes Hitler as stating:

How to achieve the moral breakdown of the enemy before the war has started--that is the problem that interests me. Whoever has experienced war at the front will want to refrain from all avoidable bloodshed.⁵²

Hart rejects the notion that military strategy must involve as Clausewitz says "the art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war." Hart does not believe that "battle is the only means to the strategical end."⁵³ Hart prefers to define strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy."⁵⁴ Hart accepts that at times a decisive battle may be the goal of policy. In this case, "the aim of strategy must be to bring about this battle under the most advantageous circumstances." He goes on further stating that "the perfection of strategy would be, therefore, to produce a decision without any serious fighting."⁵⁵

He believed that the job of the strategist is to seek a military decision under the most advantageous circumstances in order to produce the desired results. Therefore, "his true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation

⁵⁰ Hart, *Strategy*, 25.

⁵¹ Ibid., 162.

⁵² Ibid., 224.

⁵³ Ibid., 333.

so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this."⁵⁶ Finally, Hart reminds us that "the object in war is to attain a better peace--even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire."⁵⁷

Liddell Hart was critical of Clausewitz on several points. His most relevant criticism is that Clausewitz focused on war to the detriment of the subsequent peace. Hart stated that "by making battle appear the only 'real warlike activity,' his gospel deprived strategy of its laurels, reduced the art of war to the mechanics of mass slaughter, and incited generals to seek battle at the first opportunity, instead of creating an *advantageous* opportunity."⁵⁸ Despite his critiques of Clausewitz, it is his doctrine and not Hart's that is more often quoted. Let us now pursue this other trend in military thought starting with its origination by Machiavelli.

Machiavelli

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) was an Italian historian, statesman, and political philosopher, who is famous for his so-called amoral writings on statecraft. As a result, his name has become a synonym for cunning and duplicity.⁵⁹ He participated in the Pisan War (1495-1509) and the War of the Holy League (1511-1514). He was actually much less cynical and amoral than popularly believed.⁶⁰ In his most famous work, *The Prince* (1532), he describes the method by which a

⁵⁴ Ibid., 335.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 338.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 339.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 366.

⁵⁸ Christopher Bassford, *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815-1945*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 130.

⁵⁹ "Machiavelli, Niccolo," *Microsoft® Encarta® 97 Encyclopedia*. (Eugene: Microsoft Corporation, 1997).

prince can acquire and maintain political power.⁶¹ His other famous works are *The Art of War* (1521) and *The Discourses on Livy* (1531). Only *The Art of War* was published before his death.⁶²

Machiavelli holds a unique position in the field of military theory because his thoughts demonstrate recognition of the changes that occurred in warfare as a result of new technologies and social development.⁶³ He is the first recognized author to challenge the “religious concept of war as an act of rendering justice” by knights during the Middle Ages.⁶⁴ However, the “new” principles of military warfare that Machiavelli referred to were actually his attempt to demonstrate how the ancient Romans conducted war. These principles were presented in dialogue form and were largely drawn from the ancient writings of Vegetius.⁶⁵

Machiavelli believed that the objective of war was to “face any enemy in the field and to defeat him there.” This was method was the only manner “to bring a war to a happy conclusion.”⁶⁶ In the preface to his *Art of War*, Machiavelli reminds us that the ancient Roman leaders took efforts to inspire soldiers with love of peace. “Who ought to be fonder of peace than soldiers whose life is placed in jeopardy by war?” Accordingly, once the decision to go to war was made, he believed that they every effort should be made to bring it to as quick a conclusion as possible. The best strategy, which assured this result, was the complete defeat of the enemy’s

⁶⁰ Trevor Dupuy, 469.

⁶¹ “Machiavelli, Niccolo.”

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Gilbert, 11.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 13.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 22.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 23.

forces.⁶⁷

In *The Discourses*, Machiavelli states that wars should be "short and sharp." He believed that such quick, decisive results could only be attained by battle. Because the war's outcome depended on the battle's outcome, it followed that a military leader needed to do everything possible to ensure victory through combat. This included using one's full military force even if the enemy appeared to be of inferior strength.⁶⁸ Military campaigns were to be conducted with an emphasis on detailed planning, under a single commander, and should culminate in a final battle of decision.⁶⁹

The survival of the state was central to Machiavelli's works. Key to this concept was the performance of its army. Therefore, the political institutions needed to assist the formation of a successful army.⁷⁰ One of Machiavelli's most famous ideas is that military forces should be composed of the inhabitants of the state that the army is to defend. He cited the fact that "The present ruin of Italy is the result of nothing else than reliance upon mercenaries."⁷¹

Montecuccoli

Prince Raimondo Montecuccoli (1609-1680) was an Italian field marshal in the service of the Austrian Hapsburg's army. He played important roles in the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), Turkish War (1661-1664), and the Dutch War (1672-1678).⁷² His military writings, written from 1640-1670, demonstrated the first formal

⁶⁷ Ibid., 24.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 25.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 29.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 29.

⁷¹ Ibid., 26.

⁷² Trevor Dupuy, 518-519.

effort to attempt a general analysis of warfare in order to discover its guiding principles.⁷³

Montecuccoli “searched for a universal paradigm, an integration of all knowledge, scientific, military, and political, derived from experience, yet firmly within the framework of the Catholic Church”. His aim was to apply these maxims to make warfare more predictable in order to reduce the number of casualties it produced. Although he was a successful practitioner of war, during his lifetime, he was criticized as a timid commander. He even was accused of being a “Fabius Cunctator”. These charges did not seem to bother him. Montecuccoli replied that “one ought to study the dictator Fabius to learn that after a series of defeats it is necessary to change one’s fighting methods and meanwhile to adopt a strategy of attrition.”⁷⁴ He thus failed to see the real advantage of a Fabian Strategy under certain conditions.

Nonetheless, there was no doubt about his beliefs on the utility of the decisive battle. He wrote, “There are those who deceive themselves that war can be waged without battle. But conquests and decisions can only be achieved by combat and battle and to believe otherwise is a delusion.”⁷⁵ “If someone wants to make war in this fashion he is grasping at shadows and misses the substance.” Therefore, only through decisive battle was it possible to bring war to an end.⁷⁶ Although he viewed war as a great evil, Montecuccoli also believed it was part of the natural order of

⁷³ Gunther E. Rothenburg, “Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the ‘Military Revolution’ of the Seventeenth Century,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed., Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 55.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 56.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 56.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 57.

things. Therefore, "one must suppress or be suppressed, one must either kill or perish."⁷⁷

He recognized the importance of the economy in war when he said that "money, money, and again money" was the "very nerve of war." Finally, he would foreshadow Clausewitz's use of friction when he advised that "one should weigh matters carefully and then execute them rapidly" because in war it was impossible to calculate all factors in advance. Some of the factors would be "left to fortune" because "he who worries about everything achieves nothing; he who worries about too little deceives himself."⁷⁸

Jomini

By the middle of the eighteenth century, pioneers were working in all fields to discover and establish universally valid principles, which would replace unthinking adherence to traditional patterns of thought. However, the activity of war was still without its Newton.⁷⁹ At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the precise operational analysis of General (Baron) Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) was submitted as the new universal theory of warfare.⁸⁰ His major campaigns included the Napoleonic Wars (1800-1815) and the Russo-Turkish War (1828-1829).⁸¹

Jomini was of Swiss origin and first came to prominence in 1803 when General Ney, commander of the French Sixth Corps, subsidized the publication of his first book.⁸² Until his death, Jomini continued to write and defend his basic

⁷⁷ Ibid., 60-61.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 61.

⁷⁹ Michael Howard, *Studies in War and Peace*, (New York: The Viking Press, 1970), 22.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 26.

⁸¹ Trevor Dupuy, 379.

⁸² John Shy, "Jomini," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed., Peter

military theory.⁸³ His main work, *Summary of the Art of War* (1838) became, in its numerous translations, the “premier military-educational text of the mid-nineteenth century.”⁸⁴ As Hittle noted, “It has been said with good reason that many a Civil War general went into battle with a sword in one hand and Jomini’s *Summary of the Art of War* in the other”.⁸⁵ All totaled, Jomini published twenty-seven volumes on warfare.⁸⁶

Jomini first began to write in 1803 after studying the campaigns of Frederic the Great and Napoleon. Jomini believed that their operations revealed to him the true principles of strategy, which had eluded the theorists of the eighteenth century. Jomini followed the theoretical framework established by the military thinkers of the Enlightenment.⁸⁷ Jomini insisted throughout his life the validity of the principles he had discovered in 1803.⁸⁸ In short, they consisted of “directing the mass of one’s forces successively on to the decisive points in the theatre of war...maneuvering so as to engage this concentration of forces only against fractions of the enemy’s strength,” and “concentrate the bulk of one’s forces at the decisive point.”⁸⁹ He believed that the secret of operations lay in the concentration of maximum force to achieve local superiority at the decisive point. Therefore, operations should usually be directed against one of the extremities of the enemy’s front or his rear.⁹⁰

Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 146.

⁸³ Ibid., 153.

⁸⁴ Bassford, 18.

⁸⁵ J.D. Hittle, ed., *Roots of Strategy: Book 2*, (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1987), 396.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 402.

⁸⁷ Azar Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought: from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 106.

⁸⁸ Shy, 146.

⁸⁹ Howard, 53.

⁹⁰ Baron de Jomini, *Summary of the Art of War*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1838), 12.

For Jomini, the decisive point was key to victory in war. He believed that there is "in every battle-field a decisive point, the possession of which, more than of any other, helps to secure the victory...."⁹¹ Determining the decisive point is imperative if one is to properly follow Jomini's principles. He stated that "when a military man who is a student of his art has become fully impressed by the advantages procured by moving a strong mass against successive fractions of the enemy's force... he will naturally be able to perceive at a glance what are these decisive points."⁹² A more direct method to find the decisive point "will be determined by, -- 1. The features of the ground 2. The relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim 3. The positions occupied by the respective forces."⁹³

Most importantly, for our purposes, is that he rejected the notion that campaigns could be won without battles. He stressed that the primary objective in war was always the destruction of the enemy army.⁹⁴ Jomini expresses this despite the fact that he recognized that it was possible to neutralize an army without killing its soldiers when he says "armies have been destroyed by strategic operations without the occurrence of pitched battles."⁹⁵ Nonetheless, it was he who strengthened the concept that bloody battles were essential in war strategy. It would be Clausewitz who would take this concept even further.

Clausewitz

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was a Prussian officer and military

⁹¹ Ibid., 171.

⁹² Ibid., 306.

⁹³ Ibid., 80.

⁹⁴ Howard, 34.

⁹⁵ Jomini, 178.

theorist.⁹⁶ As Bassford noted, "The musings of General Carl Philip Gottlieb von Clausewitz, a Prussian soldier who fought against Napoleon and who died over 160 years ago, have come to dominate military thinking and writing in English."⁹⁷ At the beginning of the 20th century, his ideas on the superior use of force through the massing of troops were considered most relevant. Currently, his ideas on limited war and war's subordination to politics are what most interest war theorists.

Clausewitz fought in the Napoleonic wars for Prussia and published a few books on war. In 1827, Clausewitz began to revise his epic book *On War* following two new ideas. First, he decided to pursue the idea that there are two types of war: total and limited war. Second, he wanted to emphasize that war is the continuation of policy by other means. While he was adding these two primary concepts to his old military outlook, he died.⁹⁸ He was only able to write the last book and edit his first book with these new concepts in mind before his death. *On War* was published in 1831, a year after his death, by his widow. It was admired, but had few initial sales. Since its appearance, *On War* is known for being much quoted but little read.⁹⁹ Jomini considered it a 'labyrinth' and denounced Clausewitz as a plagiarist. The first known English translation was published in 1874. The first expertly translated and edited English version did not appear until 1976.¹⁰⁰

It was Clausewitz who, in objection to Jomini's reasoning, rejected the entire

⁹⁶ "Clausewitz, Karl von," *Microsoft® Encarta® 97 Encyclopedia*, (Eugene: Microsoft Corporation, 1997).

⁹⁷ Bassford, 209.

⁹⁸ Gat, 199.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 226.

¹⁰⁰ John R. Elting, *The Super-Strategists: Great Captains, Theorists, and Fighting Men Who Have Shaped the History of Warfare*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985), 168-169. The 1976 edition, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret into English, is the first version

military tradition of the Enlightenment. Clausewitz did not believe in the general science of war. He argued that principles of war ignored the "living reality of war, the operation of moral forces, and the unique conditions of every particular case."¹⁰¹

Clausewitz expressed the idea that the aims in war are to conquer and destroy the armed forces of the enemy, take possession of the resources of his army and to gain public opinion while in war.¹⁰²

He had an overriding concern with unlimited force in battle as the only means to achieve success in war. Clausewitz stated that "The impulse to destroy the enemy...is central to the very concept of war...war is an act of force, and there is no limit to the application of that force."¹⁰³ He went on further by saying, "Essentially war is fighting, for fighting is the only effective principle in the many fold activities generally designated as war."¹⁰⁴ Clausewitz explains that the goal of belligerents should be the total destruction of the enemy's ability to fight. As each side attempts to surpass the other's efforts, escalation and mass mobilization of forces are the likely result.¹⁰⁵ One critic pointed out that, "Clausewitz, a typical Prussian, indoctrinated the ... German military thinkers with the 'philosophy' of brutality, ... warned his pupils against attempting to disarm an enemy without the maximum of 'bloodshed,' and denounced 'moderation' in an officer as an absurdity."¹⁰⁶ Other critics point out that Clausewitz's view of war was "just the opposite from [that of] of

considered to be expertly translated and thus true to the author's original intent.

¹⁰¹ Gat, 204.

¹⁰² Ibid., 205.

¹⁰³ Clausewitz, *On War* (1831), in *On War*, ed. and tran., Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 76-77.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 127.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 77.

¹⁰⁶ Bassford, 123-124.

the enlightened statesman who regard it as the outcome of the *failure* of policy.”¹⁰⁷

Clausewitz refined the concept of friction in war. He stated that “Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.” He points out that these numerous incidents of chance combine to lower an army’s performance and fall short of its goal. “Iron will-power can overcome this friction; it pulverizes every obstacle, but of course, it wears down the machine as well.” The concept of friction is what makes “real war” different from “war on paper.” In every individual soldier exists the potential for friction that can “delay things or somehow make them go wrong.”¹⁰⁸ Essentially, the friction is so great that it “brings about effects that cannot be measured” because they are due to chance.¹⁰⁹

Clausewitz’s theory is based on a total reliance on killing in decisive battle. Clausewitz believed that “in war many different roads can lead to the goal, to the attainment of the political object, fighting is the only possible means. Everything is governed by a supreme law, the decision by force of arms....”¹¹⁰ Clausewitz has no use for practitioners who believe other approaches are possible. He conceded that perhaps in ancient times, generals like Fabius could avoid battle by maintaining a defensive strategy and using terrain to avoid battle. This was because “there could be no engagement unless both sides are willing.”¹¹¹ However, after the Seven Years War, he believed that “*difficult terrain*” was no longer a “magic circle that was

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 124.

¹⁰⁸ Clausewitz, 119.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 120.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 99.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 245.

out of bounds to the natural forces of war.” He pointed out that “today there is nothing to prevent a commander bent on a decisive battle from seeking out his enemy and attacking him.”¹¹² He stated that:

Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed.¹¹³

Clausewitz also pursued the idea that war has a useful purpose for a nation.

He said:

Today practically no means other than war will educate a people in this spirit of boldness.... Nothing else will counteract the softness and the desire for ease, which debase the people in times of growing prosperity and increasing trade. A people and nation can hope for a strong position in the world only if national character and familiarity with war fortify each other by continual interaction.¹¹⁴

Likewise, he sees no need in following any humanitarian laws or rules of war.

In *On War*, he states that “attached to force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it... moral force has no existence save as expressed in the state and the law.”¹¹⁵ With bloody battle seen as fate, perhaps we should be concerned that many in the military view Clausewitz’s theory as gospel.

Clausewitz would find any discussion highlighting war as developing a better peace ridiculous. Clausewitz stated:

Governments and commanders have always tried to find ways of avoiding a decisive battle and of reaching their goal by other means.... Laurels were to be reserved for these generals who knew how to

¹¹² Ibid., 246.

¹¹³ Ibid., 75.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 192.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 75.

conduct a war without bloodshed.... Recent history has scattered such nonsense to the winds."¹¹⁶

He said, "Even the final outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final."¹¹⁷ In addressing the aim of war, Clausewitz claims it is "to defeat the enemy." In order to do this, Clausewitz believes one should attack an enemy's "center of gravity."¹¹⁸ He defines the center of gravity as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed."¹¹⁹ In order to defeat the enemy, one must overcome "resistance concentrated in his center of gravity."¹²⁰

I have traced the two strategy-types in terms of their theoretical foundations. By doing so, I have outlined two contending approaches for the use of military force to achieve political objectives. This poses the obvious question of what relevance this background has on current U.S. military operations? This question will be answered in the following chapter.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 259.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 80.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 595.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 595-596.

CHAPTER 2

SELECTING STRATEGIES: A MILITARY DILEMMA

This chapter attempts to illuminate the dominant U.S. preference for strategy as a result of several key factors. First, the development of strategies for implementation in war is pursued from a cultural-institutional perspective. Second, the idea of the importance of casualties in war is presented. Next, I will argue that the theoretical preference for U.S. military strategy is currently one of decisive force, which is a descendent from military theorists advocating the use of decisive battle to achieve results. Finally, I present the moral dilemma that military commanders must face when selecting or recommending one military strategy over another.

Strategic Decisions

As Hoffman notes, "The decision to use force is a critical matter for any state." Critical to this decision is the advice of military leaders.¹²¹ How combat operations are conducted, depends largely on the military strategies which they prepare and recommend. Therefore, it is important to trace the institutional culture of military organizations in order to predict the types of strategies which are likely to be implemented.

Strategic decisions are not made without considering their possible impact on

¹²⁰ Ibid., 596.

¹²¹ E.G. Hoffman, *Decisive Force: The New American Way of War*, (Westport: Preager Publishers, 1996), xiv.

the enemy's strategy. The interaction between strategies makes it even more difficult to determine the best course of action. After the fact, it might be obvious which was the best strategy to employ. However, competing and incomplete information during crisis situations makes it difficult to choose with certainty. After choosing a strategy, "It is hard to know when your strategy is failing" or succeeding for that matter.¹²² Furthermore, if decision-makers wait until the situation becomes clearer, then they are liable to miss their opportunity to act. As King Faud of Saudi Arabia pointed out, "The Kuwaitis did not rush into a decision, and today they are guests in our hotels!"¹²³ Given the seriousness of war-making and the enormous cost involved, military leaders have an almost compelling interest to implement what they consider to be the best strategy available, which can secure the political objective. However, what does the *best* strategy mean?

Casualties in War

The extent to which low casualty rates have been sought after by armies has changed enormously in 20th century warfare. In World War I, "British infantry officers whose units suffered low casualties were ruined because they were seen as lacking the essential esprit de corps." Such a low rate supposedly indicated that a unit was "shirking" and not performing its fair share of the burden.¹²⁴ The opposite attitude has now taken hold. Low casualty rates are the goal in all measures of military effectiveness.

This desire for low casualty rates presents a dilemma for U.S. strategists.

¹²² Scott Sigmund Gartner, *Strategic Assessment in War*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997),

24.

¹²³ Ibid., 7.

Schwarz notes that a nation's "tolerance for pain" can often play a decisive role in warfare.¹²⁵ It is often cited that since the Vietnam War, the U.S. is no longer able to tolerate high casualty rates in military operations.¹²⁶ Specifically, "America's pain threshold" is believed by many U.S. policymakers to be its strategic Achilles' heel.¹²⁷ However, this is probably an oversimplification. The truth appears to be more subtle.

In a study on this subject, Larson found that tolerance for casualties is based on the benefits to be achieved and the importance of the interests at stake. The higher the stakes are the more likely the public will tolerate high casualty rate. However, when U.S. interests are poorly defined, public support is likely to be low reflecting that the prospective benefits of the operation do not justify its cost in life.¹²⁸ For example, the gravity of the situation in World War II led to a high tolerance for casualties.¹²⁹ However, wars of "more limited ends have justified more limited means." Accordingly, the public has indicated a lower tolerance for casualties in those types of conflict.¹³⁰

Once committed to the course of war, the public "shows little inclination to quit an intervention and instead strongly supports and escalation of the conflict and measures it believes necessary to win a decisive victory."¹³¹ Larsen presents a

¹²⁴ Ibid., 5.

¹²⁵ Benjamin C. Schwarz, *Casualties, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Intervention: Implications for U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1994), 3.

¹²⁶ Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations*, (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 1996), xv.

¹²⁷ Schwarz, 3.

¹²⁸ Larson, 49.

¹²⁹ Ibid., xvi.

¹³⁰ Ibid., xvii.

¹³¹ Schwarz, x.

model, which assists us in viewing public support. His model lists four questions, which the public collectively asks themselves with regard to support for military operations. They are:

- Do the benefits seem to be great enough?
- Are the prospects for success good enough?
- Are the expected or actual costs low enough?
- Taken together, does the probable outcome seem (or seem still) to be worth the costs?"¹³²

Ultimately, when the American public is asked to support a military operation, they "must weigh the benefits of achieving foreign policy objectives against the most tangible costs imaginable—the lives of U.S. service personnel."¹³³ "For in the end, most Americans do not want lives to be sacrificed for any but the most compelling and promising causes."¹³⁴ Making it even more difficult for American military leaders is the fact the public expects casualties to be low. The median number of acceptable deaths in a hypothetical intervention was only 100 U.S. battle casualties.¹³⁵ With this in mind, the strategy chosen by the U.S. military must take into account the likely number of anticipated casualties as a key-planning factor.

Military Strategy Defined

With the realization that military leaders must take into account casualties in military operations, we can see that it is not merely the purview of diplomats to use less destructive methods to achieve political goals. One could argue that it is rational for military leaders to use the least destructive methods capable of achieving their goals because it assists in establishing a better peace. The difficult question is

¹³² Larson, xviii.

¹³³ Ibid., xxii.

¹³⁴ Ibid., xxiii.

how to formulate an effective strategy, which implements this approach. To this end, military strategy can be defined as “the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.”¹³⁶ Gray viewed strategy as a “bridge connecting means with ends.” Taken as such, policymakers “should ask neither too much nor too little from their armed forces.” These forces should be structured and used only for feasible policy pursuits. Gray points to America’s Vietnam War policy as a failure because of poor strategy. However, rather than just blaming the civilian leadership, he also cites the overconfident military professionals for failing to find “the proper mix of policy and force.”¹³⁷

Military means and policy objectives need to be mutually adjusted by the dynamic use of strategy.¹³⁸ This judgement on “operational feasibility” is the responsibility of the military professional. It is his duty to “create and adapt means and methods for the accomplishment of objectives identified as necessary or desirable by policy.” Likewise, it is his duty to educate policymakers on the capability limits of the use of military force in achieving political objectives.¹³⁹ A constant problem for so-called grand strategists has been the difficulty in deciding how heavily to rely on the military instrument of power to achieve political objectives.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 8.

¹³⁶ Anonymous, “Guidelines for Strategy,” in *Assessing US National Strategy, Defense Strategy Course, US Army War College AY 1993*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 24.

¹³⁷ Colin S. Gray, *Weapons Don’t Make War: Policy Strategy, and Military Technology*, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 174.

¹³⁸ Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 24-25.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 126.

The critical question becomes "Where is the culminating point of victory?"¹⁴⁰

Theoretical Preference for U.S. Military Strategy

To pursue this issue, we need to first determine what the current theoretical foundation for U.S. military theory is. In order to do so, I will start briefly with the Vietnam War and move forward. Summers claims that the loss of the Vietnam War was not merely a failure of military strategy, but of the wrong type of strategy. He posits that "it was ignorance of Clausewitz's fundamental war-fighting principles that led to our failure in Vietnam."¹⁴¹ Instead, he claims that the American war-fighting philosophy prior to and including the Vietnam War was based on Jomini's *Art of War* and Upton's *The Military Policy of the United States*.¹⁴²

Summers cites a resurgence of Clausewitzian theory in the U.S. Military in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This change in doctrine was led by strategic thinkers in the Air Force "that would come to fruition almost two decades later in the Persian Gulf War."¹⁴³ In *On Strategy II*, Summers proposes that victory in the Persian Gulf War was forged because of the use of Clausewitzian theory by the U.S. military after the Vietnam War.¹⁴⁴ As Daalder notes, the current U.S. military's doctrine is "based on a classic, inter-state war scenario in which political objectives are clear, and in which force can be applied in overwhelming fashion against easily identifiable and clearly separated combatants."¹⁴⁵ This leads us to the conclusion that Clausewitz's

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 30.

¹⁴¹ Harry G. Summers, foreword to *War, Politics and Power, Edward: Selections from On War, I Believe and Profess*, trans. and ed., Edward M. Collins, (Washington D.C.: Regnery, 1997), x.

¹⁴² Ibid., xi.

¹⁴³ Ibid., xiv.

¹⁴⁴ Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy II*, (New York: Dell Publishing, 1992), 3.

¹⁴⁵ Ivo H. Daalder, "Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, William J. Durch, (New

theory is the dominant theory in U.S. military policy formulation. If this is the case, then we will be able to see its impact in the military strategy employed to secure political objectives in war. In order to do so, we need to know what the theory consists of.

The "American Way of War" is referred to by Weigley as the "military's orientation and preferred operational style."¹⁴⁶ It is a strategic culture "that employs the vast economic and technological base of the United States to grind down opponents with firepower and mass."¹⁴⁷ This preference has been described as one that is predisposed toward "strategic offensives supported by full national mobilization, employing the economic and technological assets of the nation, to bring a preponderance of power in the most decisive manner possible."¹⁴⁸ Weigley's work contrasted the two poles of attrition and annihilation warfare.¹⁴⁹ To this pair, I have added an often-overlooked strategic approach, which does not rely on massive killing, but can still obtain political results with the use of force.

The Morality of Strategy

Walzer points out that although generals can agree on the meanings of strategic terms, they disagree regularly on the best strategic course of action. "Strategy, like morality, is a language of justification." The fact that we agonize over the appropriateness of strategic decisions is "a product of our moral views".¹⁵⁰ The horror and danger of resorting to war is clearly recognized by the military. General

York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 473.

¹⁴⁶ Hoffman, 1.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., xi.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 1.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 9

¹⁵⁰ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, (New York,

Eisenhower once said, "When you resorted to force...you didn't know where you were going...If you got deeper and deeper, there was just no limit except...the limitations of force itself."¹⁵¹

One justification for pursuing the most destructive strategy could be the type of argument Sherman made in the Civil War. He said:

War is cruelty and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifice today than any of you to secure peace."¹⁵²

Sherman is expressing the argument that he is only fighting because he has to and feels no moral restraint in the use of force because his aim is a better peace. When given the opportunity to pursue a beaten enemy he declines. Instead Sherman proposed, "to demonstrate the vulnerability of the South and make its inhabitants feel that war and individual ruin are synonymous terms...To pursue Hood is folly, for he can twist and turn like a fox, and wear out any army in pursuit."¹⁵³ So we have Sherman's answer to the Fabian Strategy. If the enemy army cannot be destroyed, then make the population who support the war suffer until they capitulate.

However, Sherman's argument goes against the immunity of noncombatants in war as "combat between combatants".¹⁵⁴ Walzer points out that this is not just a recent trend to limit warfare, but a common practice among primitive peoples as well.¹⁵⁵ Walzer calls these self-imposed restraints that shape our judgement of

Basic Books, 1977), 15.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 23.

¹⁵² B.H. Liddell Hart, *Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1929), 310.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 323-324.

¹⁵⁴ Walzer, 42.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 43.

warfare the "war convention."¹⁵⁶ Although he acknowledges that the debate is imperfect, it still represents a valid attempt to make war less vial.¹⁵⁷ I am not taking the approach that decisive warfare necessarily is immoral because it *a/ways* leads to killing noncombatants. Instead, I am using this example to illustrate that when battle is seen as the only recourse, strategy tends to lend itself to the extreme application of that capability.

Another argument of the morality to reduce killing in war comes from General von Moltke when he protested against an early effort to codify the rules of war, "The greatest kindness in war is to bring it to a speedy conclusion. It should be allowable, with that view, to employ all means save those that are absolutely objectionable." Walzer points out that this argument represents "the most common argument in the theory of war and of the most common moral dilemma in its practice."¹⁵⁸ That is to say that morality in war stands in the path of victory and a long-term peace. Or as Walzer frames the dilemma, "We want to have it both ways: moral decency in battle and victory in war."¹⁵⁹ Therefore, armies are entitled to attempt to gain victory in war, but they are not entitled to do anything in order to win.¹⁶⁰

I will close with another historical example, which I believe illustrates the moral dilemma of strategy rather succinctly. In 638 B.C., the two feudal states of Sung and Ch'u fought a battle at the Hung River. The Duke of Sung's army was in battle formation on the northern bank as the army of Ch'u began to ford. When the

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 44.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 46.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 47.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 47.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 131.

army was half way across, one of the Duke's ministers is reported to have said, "They are many, and we are few. Pray let us attack them before they are all crossed over." The Duke refused again and again to attack until the army of Ch'u was marshaled across the river. Only then, did he attack. The Duke's army was soundly defeated. In defending his actions, the Duke stated:

When the ancients had their armies in the field, they would not attack an enemy when he was in a defile; and though I am but the poor representative of a fallen dynasty, I will not sound my drums to attack an unformed host.¹⁶¹

This event would have remained an obscure event in history had it not been drawn on in a lesson from Mao Tse-tung in his *On Protracted War* (1938). Mao said, "We are not the Duke of Sung and we have no use for his asinine ethics."¹⁶² For our purposes, this represents the pragmatic concept that winning is more important than ethics or morality in strategy and any attempt to subvert this may result in military defeat.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 225.

¹⁶² Ibid., 226.

CHAPTER 3

THE THEORETICAL DEBATE AND OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

With the two contending approaches of decisive force and Fabian strategy in mind, how can we establish a study, which could assist us in shedding light on the theoretical debate? The comparative method could be of some help in moving theory from the abstract into action. George sites that the "critical variables" and the "general logic" of a strategy are associated ultimately with the successful use of that strategy.¹⁶³ He found that the abstract model was useful in the starting point for constructing a strategy.¹⁶⁴ To move the model further along, policymakers must "tailor the abstract model into a specific strategy for the particular situation."¹⁶⁵

For example, in order for us to convert the model of a bloodless military strategy into a specific strategy, George suggests that we must specify each of the variable-components of this general model. Perhaps a listing of these variables might contain the following elements: 1) A state of war exists. 2) The armed forces are operating toward achieving a political goal. 3) One side has the capacity to maneuver its forces into such an overwhelmingly strong position that the other side is compelled to surrender it armed forces. 4) The political goal is achieved without

¹⁶³ Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), 118.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 118.

resorting to heavy fighting.

The limiting characteristic of this type of abstract model is that it is not a fully developed deductive theory, which could be used to predict the success of the bloodless military strategy in a particular situation. As George points out, theories, which meet this stringent criteria "do not exist and will be difficult to develop."¹⁶⁶ This fault can be compensated for by "identifying conditions, that if present in a particular case, favor the success of the strategy."¹⁶⁷ The form this type of strategy would undertake is one of conditional generalizations that are more useful to policymaking because they identify the conditions under which the relationship does and does not hold.¹⁶⁸

As George points out, it is advisable to put aside the search for *necessary* or *sufficient* conditions and instead look for favoring conditions that make the strategy more likely to succeed in a particular case. So, when certain conditions exist, they make the situation ripe for the implementation of a conditional strategy.¹⁶⁹ George then recommends that the "favoring conditions for a strategy constitute a checklist" that can be used when conducting an analysis of the situation.¹⁷⁰ With regard to my work, I would need to find a case or cases where the conditions could be analyzed.

In so doing, we need to establish a method that considers the best cases available for study. By limiting the scope to certain variables, we reduce the number of available case studies. In this situation, Lijphart recommends that the

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 118.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 119.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 120.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 120.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 122.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 125.

comparative method be used instead of the scientific method because the number of cases prevents establishing partial correlation.¹⁷¹ Lijphart concedes that the comparative method is not really the equivalent of the experimental method but rather an imperfect substitute. The weaknesses of the comparative method can be minimized.¹⁷² First, we should try to increase the number of cases as much as possible.¹⁷³ This could be done by exhaustive search historical situations, which meet our defined criteria. Second, we can try to reduce the number of variables being studied by attempting to combine as many as possible similar variables under the same listing. This attempts to reduce the number of possible relationships involved. Third, we can attempt to focus our analysis on comparable cases. This means using cases with as many similar important characteristics as possible so that we can treat these variables as constants while attempting to identify the relationships that causes their differences.¹⁷⁴ The difficulty in this is that historical events spaced over a period of time are still very difficult to compare. However, this method is still better than randomly selecting cases.¹⁷⁵ Fourth, we should attempt to focus our analysis on the key variables and avoid attempting to explain marginally important ones. This means we should scan the case studies for important variables, but not necessarily include all of them in our analysis.¹⁷⁶

Let us assume that we widely search for historical examples indicating a Fabian or bloodless military strategy. Next, we reduce the number of variables to a

¹⁷¹ Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." *The American Political Science Review*, volume 65, 1971, 684.

¹⁷² Ibid., 685.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 686.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 687.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 689.

workable amount. For the sake of this paper, I have removed the nuclear variable by excluding all cases where both belligerents have nuclear weapons and where the threat of nuclear weapons was used. To further limit the scope, we can limit the time span to conflicts unrelated to the Cold War so that the results cannot be tied to that conflict. This also helps to increase the comparability of events over a shorter time period. Lastly, I'll reduce the number of conflicts so that the US must be one of the belligerents. I have trimmed the focus down in order to make comparisons easier. However, the number of cases is now severely limited. Therefore, I will use the case study method. Lijphart proposed that the case study method is closely related to the comparative method. The advantage of focusing on only a few cases is that we are able to explore their elements to the minutest detail. Using the example of the bloodless military strategy, we could develop one event into what Lijphart calls a hypothesis-generating case. The case study then becomes a test of proposition, which can then be confirmed or denied.¹⁷⁷

Other comparative techniques could further be used to help avoid error. In his article on case studies, George points out two of the common mistakes in drawing lessons out of historical events. First, people disagree what the correct lesson is. Second, they misapply the lessons to situations that actually differ from the past in important aspects. He believes that the best way to prevent these mistakes is by stating the lessons in a "systematic and differentiated way."¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 690.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 692.

¹⁷⁸ Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, ed., Paul Gordon Lauren, (New York, The Free Press, 1979), 43.

Despite the claim by some historians that history does not repeat itself and each event must be measured by its own standards, there are many “types of undertakings and phenomena that occur repeatedly throughout history.”¹⁷⁹

George proposes a three-phased approach to conducting controlled comparison or single case studies. He refers to this method as the “method of structured, focused comparison.”¹⁸⁰ In phase one, five tasks are accomplished in designing the study. First, the type or classification of behavior is singled out. The existing theory is examined in the context of the phenomenon under study. Then, specific aspects of the existing theory will be focused on for further elaboration. For this paper, the type of activity is conventional warfare among states.

Second, the independent and dependent variables are specified. The dependent variable is the outcome, which is trying to be explained. The independent and intervening variables are identified as well as those variables which are to be held as constants across all the cases.¹⁸¹ My paper proposes to study events where strategic success in war is gained without resorting to a bloody battle (dependent variable). The independent variable is what causes this to occur. It could be the skill of the general, as Saxe would suggest. Or, it may be due to superior training, excellent equipment, or factors of terrain. Intervening variables such as the weather or intelligence could also factor into the equation.

Third, appropriate cases are selected for comparison from the criteria already established in steps one and two. The cases must be of the same category or type

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 45.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 61.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 54.

that is to be studied and have many of the key variables present. Using the previously mentioned criteria, I have limited the events to major U.S. military contingency operations unrelated to the Cold War.

Next, the researcher must search for the best way to explain variance between the dependent and independent variables to further the process of theory development.¹⁸² For my paper, I have attempted to analyze the variables of political leadership, military commanders, casualties, public opinion, and the war outcome (the resulting peace) across the major U.S. contingency operations unrelated to the Cold War.

Fifth, the general questions must be established which are to be asked of each chosen case in the controlled comparison. Each case is then studied with the view of answering each question.¹⁸³ Our questions could be the following: Was strategic success obtained without resorting to massive killing? If not, was a bloodless military strategy possible? Under what conditions would such a strategy most likely succeed? How did the casualties effect public opinion and the resulting peace?

Phase two involves undertaking analysis of each case study. Each of the established questions is answered. In attempting to formulate an explanation, the researcher uses the method of causal imputation. This means the explanation needs to be strong enough that alternative explanations are less consistent with the information available and therefore less likely to support the generalizations.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸² Ibid., 55.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 56.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 57-58.


Phase three involves drawing out the theoretical implications of the case studies. The researcher looks at the answers he induced from the case studies and then compares them to the original theory under investigation. He then assesses where the theory needs to be further refined or elaborated on as a result of the analysis.¹⁸⁵ The researcher who uses this strategy is trying to identify the different causal patterns that can occur for the type or category of phenomenon under study. He further attempts to identify the best conditions under which each causal pattern occurs rather than looking at how often they occur.¹⁸⁶ I do this in my conclusion.

Operation Uphold Democracy

My example case for demonstrating a bloodless military strategy is Operation Uphold Democracy conducted in 1994. Although some make look at this case as one of coercive diplomacy, I submit that it does not fall into that category because combat operations were actually underway when the political objective was secured. In this contingency operation, the United States used its military forces to forcefully compel the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. Prior to this event, most people would have opposed U.S. military intervention into the internal affairs of another country with little argument. However, the Haitian action ended this type of consensus. In the dramatic events that shaped the end of the Cold War, the U.S. landed troops on Haitian soil in order to remove a right-wing military dictatorship and restore a democratically elected president to power. This was a far cry from the usual military interventions the U.S. had undertaken in the Caribbean and Latin

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 58.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 60.



America throughout most of the 20th century.¹⁸⁷

In December 1990, Aristide won 67% of the vote in a presidential election. He took office in February 1991, but was overthrown a little over six months later by dissatisfied elements of the army and was forced to leave the country.¹⁸⁸ In June 1991, the Organization of American States (OAS) had passed a resolution establishing the democracy as the main requirement for membership. It further pledged to suspend membership of any state whose government was overthrown by a coup. While wishing to increase the heat on Cuba, the Bush Administration would have found it difficult to garner regional support if supported the take over by Cedras.¹⁸⁹ However, Bush was not willing to attempt to force Cedras out of power.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ Deidre McFadyen, Peirre LaRamee, Mark Fried, and Fred Rosen, ed., *Haiti: Dangerous Crossroads*, (Boston: South End Press, 1995), 1.

¹⁸⁸ John Pike, "Operation Uphold Democracy," Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network, <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/uphold_democracy.htm>, 15 January 1999.

¹⁸⁹ Alex Dupuy, *Haiti in the World Order: The Limits of the Democratic Revolution*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 138.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 140.

As a candidate in 1992, Clinton promised to end Bush's "inhumane" policy of repatriating Haitian refugees. However, once in office, President Clinton continued Bush's policy in order to prevent waves of Haitian boat people landing on U.S. shores. Clinton's initial policy's goal was to work out a diplomatic solution that would address the long-term situation in Haiti.¹⁹¹ Despite a long process of diplomatic negotiations, the U.S. could not get Cedras to stick to a deal. In July 1994, the UN adopted Resolution 940, which authorized the use, all means necessary to facilitate the removal of Haiti's military leadership and restore the democratically elected Aristide to power.¹⁹² As a result, Clinton set the stage for military action when he revealed in a televised address that "Cedras and his armed thugs have conducted a reign of terror, executing children, raping women, killing priests...we must act."¹⁹³

The commander of the Joint Task Force, Lieutenant General Henry H. Shelton, went to Haiti prepared for war, but quickly adjusted his mission on short notice to a permissive entry operation.¹⁹⁴ The deployment was conducted under the legitimacy of UN Security Council Resolution 940, which constituted the first time the UN approved an invasion of a country in the Western Hemisphere.¹⁹⁵ As the invasion forces departed for Haiti, President Clinton made a final effort to settle the dispute without having to resort to battle. Using a delegation consisting of Former President Carter, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn, Clinton attempted to secure a deal which would

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 140.

¹⁹² Pike, 15 January 1999.

¹⁹³ Kim Ives in *Haiti: Dangerous Crossroads*, Deidre McFadyen, Peirre LaRamee, Mark Fried, and Fred Rosen, ed., (Boston: South End Press, 1995), 113.

¹⁹⁴ John M. Shalikashvili, *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), VII-1.

prevent needless bloodshed. With an invasion armada off the coast and 60 planes or paratroopers and equipment in the air, a last minute deal was struck only four hour before the battle was to begin which allowed for the peaceful removal of General Cedras.¹⁹⁶ Although the Haitian military and police units did not cooperate completely resulting in a few minor skirmishes¹⁹⁷, on October, 15 1994 President Aristide assumed duties as president.¹⁹⁸ By using the Fabian or bloodless military strategy theory as an example, I have illustrated important elements of the comparative method and demonstrated how my study was conducted. In the conclusion, I give the results after looking at other important cases. Such a case study could be used to refute Clausewitz's dictum that bloody battle is essential to achieving successful strategic results in war.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., VII-2.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., VII-4.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., VII-5.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., VII-8.

CHAPTER 4

THE EVOLUTION OF DECISIVE FORCE: OPERATION JUST CAUSE

In 1977, Mervyn Meggitt used an anthropological approach to examine the primitive military practices of the Mae, a people of the western highlands of Papua New Guinea. Noteworthy to our discussion is the process used to establish peace. After a conflict "it becomes the task of the Big Men (and not of the men who are merely fight leaders) to organize promptly the large-scale meetings at which the contestants...exchange pork in considerable quantities to mark the re-establishment of peace between them."¹⁹⁹ In the complex negotiations the Mae attempt to equate the "homicide payments" on a scale of lives lost. However, the traditional equations developed over centuries cannot be used without considering the recent battle. This is because the ability to "terminate a confrontation promptly in this way in turn depends importantly on what has happened in the combat."²⁰⁰

These quotations on how primitive peoples ended conflict raise important issues for US military strategy in modern warfare. Specifically, how can military strategy best achieve its objects and also establish the conditions for a better peace? Implicit in this question is the idea that the theoretical foundation of military

¹⁹⁹ Mervyn Meggitt, *Blood is their Argument: Warfare among the Mae Enga Tribesmen of the New Guinea Highlands*, (Palo Alto: Mayfield Publishing, 1977), 20.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 114.

professionals has an impact on the policy adapted for use. In the case of war used to obtain political objectives, this policy takes the form of military strategy. I approach the strategy question with the assumption that the most effective policy or strategy in war is to set obtainable military objectives that support political objectives for a better peace after the war. Furthermore, the strategy should be to achieve one's objectives while minimizing the number of friendly casualties and if possible, enemy casualties as well. First, we will define military strategy. Then, we will determine the current theoretical basis for current US military strategy. As an alternative to this dominant Clausewitzian theory, Hart's war theory will be presented. Next, we will analyze Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm as historical events to determine if the most effective strategy was employed. I will argue that Hart's theory of war provides a better theoretical foundation for developing strategy because of its aim during war and its focus on establishing a better peace at the conclusion of war.

Operation Just Cause

As Gilboa notes, "The invasion of Panama was the first American use of force sine 1945 that was unrelated to the Cold War." Although the U.S. has intervened in Latin America numerous times in the last 40-years, these actions were always connected to communist threats related to the Cold War. Noriega was not a communist and did not plan to move toward the Cuban or Soviet spheres of influence.²⁰¹ It also represents the evolution of the military's predilection for employing the doctrine of decisive force. As Hoffman notes, "The invasion of

²⁰¹ Eytan Gilboa, "The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War

Panama marked the post-Vietnam turning point in U.S. military strategy."²⁰²



Manuel Noriega rose to power as an intelligence officer while working for the Panamanian dictator Omar Torrijos. After Torrijos died in 1983, Noriega took control of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF). In 1987, he was accused of murdering his chief political opponent Hugo Spadafora. Many demonstrations followed which were violently put down by Noriega riot police and paramilitary dignity battalions.²⁰³ In 1988, Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega was indicted on Federal drug trafficking charges. It was believed that Noriega and his loyal PDF were a threat to stability in the region. A long year of escalating tensions led to the killing of Marine Lieutenant Robert Paz on December 16, 1989 by members of the PDF at a road

Era," *Political Science Quarterly*, 539.

²⁰² Hoffman, 62.

²⁰³ Ronald H. Cole, *Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama February 1988-January 1990*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), 6.

checkpoint.²⁰⁴

Deciding that this was not an isolated incident, the Bush administration considered the use of military force. The President wanted to know the following: If the military plan would work, why it had to be so large? Could Noriega be simply captured? How many casualties would there be? How much physical damage would be done? General Powell explained that because the entire leadership of the PDF was corrupt, it needed to be neutralized and then rebuilt for any long-term solution in Panama to take hold.²⁰⁵ He also emphasized that a "massive intervention would minimize the time available for the PDF to seize US citizens."²⁰⁶ At the end of the briefing, President Bush ordered the execution of the operation by saying "Okay, let's do it. The hell with it!"²⁰⁷

President Bush set four strategic objectives for Operation Just Cause: protect American lives, ensure the implementation of the Panama Canal Treaties, restore Panamanian democracy, and bring Manuel Noriega to justice.²⁰⁸ When Bush decided to authorize execution of Operation Just Cause, he provided one clearly political objective among the four previously mentioned: reestablish democracy in Panama. However, democracy in Panama was not declared in the military's operation and thus implied that it was the responsibility of the Panamanians to establish democracy and not the U.S. military.²⁰⁹ The operation plans developed for Just Cause did not include a description of what the end-state of democracy in

²⁰⁴ John M. Shalikashvili, "Operation Just Cause," *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), IV-1.

²⁰⁵ Cole, 29.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 29.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 30.

²⁰⁸ Fishel, 4.

Panama was to look like. Instead, they did what they were trained to do. They focused on achieving military "operational objectives, not strategic ones."²¹⁰ It was clear that Noriega must go, but it was not clear "what was desired in his place."²¹¹ President Endara observed that the U.S. "didn't have a specific plan to help us in establishing democracy..."²¹²

Strategy Formulation

The question is therefore, how did the U.S. military come up with the strategy it employed in Panama? There were three basic courses of action developed to remove Noriega from power. First, there was the contingency plan Blue Spoon, later called Just Cause, which represented the extreme use of military force. Second, there were diplomatic efforts by the State Department to cut a deal. Lastly, there was a plan developed by General Woerner, the SOUTHCOM Commander, named Fissures to "split Noriega from the rest of the PDF leadership...which would result in an internal Panamanian resolution of the problem of Noriega."²¹³

When General Thurman assumed command of USSOUTHCOM from General Woerner in September 1989, he initially gave no guidance on restoration operations. Instead, "his entire attention was devoted to Blue Spoon." The Blue Spoon operation plan that Thurman inherited incorporated some ideas from Woerner's Fissures plan.²¹⁴ Essentially, it was a "build-up of forces after execution had been decided upon which, coupled with direct psychological pressure, sought to produce

²⁰⁹ Ibid., vii.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 5.

²¹¹ Ibid., 7.

²¹² Ibid., vii.

²¹³ Ibid., 7.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 25.

a last minute Panamanian solution. If that failed, then the PDF (Panamanian Defense Forces) would be overwhelmed by the massed U.S. forces."²¹⁵ Woerner believed that his plan had a good chance of succeeding without firing a shot. However, if force were necessary he was absolutely confident of his ability to quickly overwhelm the PDF. He also de-emphasized the effects that PDF forces outside of Panama City would have on the operation. Accordingly, he planned on concentrating his forces inside Panama City to overwhelm the PDF there and to maintain civil order.²¹⁶

Thurman's new team and Lieutenant General Stiner (Commander of the XVII Airborne Corps/JTF-South) saw things differently. They believed that the PDF outside Panama City was capable of concentrating forces quickly in the event of a long U.S. build-up. They opted instead for a plan involving tactical surprise and the simultaneous attack of 27 military objectives at night. Using the same size force as Woerner, Thurman's plan required a shift in focus outside the center of the capital city. Except for the area surrounding the Commadancia, there would be few troops in the city to maintain order as the PDF seized to exist. The new plan failed to anticipate the impact this would have after the end of hostilities.²¹⁷ Further exasperating was "the propensity of the XVIII Airborne Corps to see its military role in terms that could be described as breaking things while leaving it to somebody else to put them back together."²¹⁸ In their Operations Plan (OPLAN), they made every effort to reduce their "responsibility for restoring law and order by stating, 'every

²¹⁵ Ibid., 25.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 26.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 26.

effort will be made to minimize commitments of US assets to support Civil Affairs operations...by avoiding maneuver and/or combat actions in built-up or densely populated areas, wherever possible."²¹⁹

Some efforts were made to plan for maintaining order after Noriega was removed. Civil military planners noted that "if the plan were to be implemented in the wake of combat operations, the planners deduced that there would be a complete breakdown in law and order as the PDF police abandoned their posts."²²⁰ The results would be "serious disorders, including significant looting, which would make it incumbent on US forces to establish and restore law and order until such time as a new police force could be established."²²¹

However, Thurman did believe that "massing superior forces would save lives and lead to a quick success."²²² Altogether, the revised plan would put 27,000 troops within a four to five day period. The earlier plan would have assembled 22,000 troops over a 22-day time frame.²²³ There was a very deliberate attempt made to limit casualties. Specific rules of engagement (ROE) directed commanders to use the minimum force necessary to secure military objectives. The ROE also put strict limitations on the use of heavy weapons in populated areas.²²⁴

In terms of the military plan, Operation JUST CAUSE went like clockwork as

²¹⁸ Ibid., 27.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 36.

²²⁰ Ibid., 12.

²²¹ Ibid., 13.

²²² John M. Shalikashvili, "Operation Just Cause," *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), IV-2.

²²³ Cole, 19.

²²⁴ Ibid., 23.

all military objectives were quickly secured.²²⁵ The military task force was able to focus on accomplishment of all assigned objectives and directed their efforts towards the PDF's "centers of gravity".²²⁶

One specific tactical part of the plan relevant to our discussion was the assault on Rio Hato airfield. It called for the use of two F-117 stealth aircraft to drop 2,000-pound bombs within 150 yards of the barracks of the PDF's 6th and 7th Rifle Companies in order to stun them into surrendering to US Rangers. These companies had been key to putting down a recent coup against Noriega, yet many of the troops were thought to be loyal to the U.S. Planners believed it would be better to have them surrender rather than kill them while they slept.²²⁷ When the pilots dropped the bombs, the PDF troops were momentarily stunned. However, the quickly organized their defense and fought for over five hours before they surrendered.²²⁸ This battle has been described as one of the hardest fought in the conflict.²²⁹ This tactical example clearly illustrates the dangers involved in attempting to "stun" the enemy into surrender. While attempting to keep total casualties levels low, the US ultimately suffered losses by failing to attempt to kill the enemy at their first opportunity.

Like the troops at Rio Hato, the PDF fought harder than expected. General Stiner observed after the fighting that instead of capitulating at the first sign of US troops, the PDF fought for hours killing 19 US servicemen and wounding 99.²³⁰ At

²²⁵ Fishel, 28.

²²⁶ Shalikashvili, "Operation Just Cause," IV-3.

²²⁷ Cole, 31.

²²⁸ Ibid., 39.

²²⁹ Hoffman, 64.

²³⁰ Cole, 41.

the time General Stiner also feared that PDF troops who did not surrender to the US would continue to resist using guerrilla tactics throughout Panama City.²³¹ This was one reason why Stiner stated that “we came in here with the principle of overwhelming combat power.”²³²

Fishel notes that when the U.S. has disengaged from conflicts, the termination process has rarely gone easily or according to plan as compared to the actual warfighting.²³³ This process is especially clear in the case of Panama. Early on December 20th, looting of the city began. It would quickly rise to a huge scale. For the next three to four days, “Panama City was in a state of chaos.”²³⁴ The perception was that there was no plan to deal with the looting and therefore the restoration of Panama was being conducted ad hoc.²³⁵ Nonetheless, General Thurman quickly reacted and provided assets “to assist the newly inaugurated Panamanian government.”²³⁶

The view that the responsibility for making Panama’s democracy work rested with the Panamanians was expressed in the slogan, “liberation, not occupation.” Unfortunately, the Panamanians were not prepared to govern themselves immediately. Simply inaugurating three public officials did not constitute a functioning government. The only thing they had was the popular support of the people and thus some form of legitimacy.²³⁷ However, within a year of the invasion,

²³¹ Ibid., 42.

²³² Hoffman, 66.

²³³ John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama*, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 1.

²³⁴ Ibid., 29.

²³⁵ Ibid., 31.

²³⁶ Ibid., 33.

²³⁷ Ibid., 56.

polls reflected that support for the government was at only 20%. However, clearly political violence had been halted²³⁸ and electoral reform was eventually enacted. The fact remains that the US did not adequately assist the Panamanian government in getting to a good start. President Endara said, "We had the idea first when we heard President Bush that we were going to get a massive dose, a jump start. Actually, we never received a jump start."²³⁹

In terms of public support for casualties, the invasion of Panama "enjoyed very high levels of support." The fact that it was finished quickly with relatively few deaths made it a popular war from a historical standpoint. Eight out of ten Americans supported the intervention. However, the limited aims of the conflict indicate that the public would not have supported a high casualty rate. A poll by USA Today conducted during the operation indicated that although support was high, if casualties were to mount and Noriega was not captured, those numbers were projected to fall over 20 points.²⁴⁰ This indicates the dilemma under which military leaders were put. In order to achieve success, they had to keep casualties very low. By doing so, perhaps they failed to expand their limited aims in order to incorporate more difficult to achieve political objectives, which would have resulted in a better solution for the new Panamanian government.

In this instance, the military success of Operation Just Cause was tremendous in terms of limiting the number of U.S. casualties and achieved moderate success at limiting Panamanian casualties. Nonetheless, there are those

²³⁸ Ibid., 57.

²³⁹ Ibid., 60.

²⁴⁰ Larson, 42-43.

who dispute these claims. The Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the U.S Invasion of Panama found that from "1,000 to 4,000 Panamanians were killed, thousands more were wounded, and more than 20,000 found themselves homeless."²⁴¹ The U.S. proclaimed that the invasion had low "collateral damage" in terms of deaths of civilians.

Another view has it that the bulk of the casualties were civilians.²⁴²

Furthermore, they point out that this was a result of the specific military strategy to minimize U.S. casualties by "maximizing Panamanian casualties," which the U.S. employed during the war. Although pointing out a high number of civilian deaths, the fact that the "Panamanian Constitution states that every citizen has a duty to defend the country from a foreign invasion" clouds the issue of who is a non combatant given the obligation of citizens to defend their country.²⁴³ As the Commission conceded, "It is not always so easy to differentiate between a civilian, a member of the Dignity Battalions, a PDF soldier out of uniform, or an individual Panamanian patriot willing to take life-risking actions to protest the occupation of his or her country."²⁴⁴

The Commission points out that the Bush Administration's "disproportionate use of force" was compelled by domestic political concerns. Those concerns were that the war be ended quickly and with few U.S. casualties.²⁴⁵ Bush was fearful of what President Reagan referred to as the "Vietnam Syndrome". This affliction

²⁴¹ Independent Commission of Inquiry on the U.S. Invasion of Panama, *The U.S. Invasion of Panama: The Truth Behind Operation 'Just Cause'*, (Boston: South End Press, 1991), 1.

²⁴² Ibid., 34.

²⁴³ Ibid., 29.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 37.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 26.

effected the American people, who, after initially supporting the war in Vietnam, became against the war as it dragged on with no end in sight and casualties continued to mount. In the case of Panama, the Bush Administration wanted to prevent a protracted conflict that could split American society.²⁴⁶ Therefore, the U.S. military strategy was “designed to minimize U.S. casualties by employing overwhelming and superior forces simultaneously against all perceived pro-government strongholds.” The Report goes on to state that “disproportionate use of force and ‘overkill’ were the hallmark of a strategy aimed at quickly crushing the armed opposition and intimidating pro-government supporters.”²⁴⁷

Taking this view into account exposes the failure of the military strategy adopted to fully plan for events after the cessation of hostilities. This failure of policy can be directly traced to a weakness in Clausewitzian theory for establishing a better peace after the war is over. U.S. military leaders focused almost wholly on wartime objectives and neglected what they would do after the war over. As Hoffman points out, “The strategic end-state was of a very political nature, but the military planning focused solely on military aspects of the problem.”²⁴⁸ As a result, Panamanian democracy got off to a weak start.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 27.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 27.

²⁴⁸ Hoffman, 72.

CHAPTER 5

VALIDATION OF THE NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR: THE GULF WAR

On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein launched an Iraqi attack against Kuwait. Iraq quickly conquered and annexed Kuwait's territory. A U.S.-led coalition set out first to protect Saudi Arabia, then to liberate Kuwait. In January 1991, the coalition began a massive air war to destroy Iraq's military and civil infrastructure. In the first two weeks of the air campaign, the allies dropped more bombs than they did during all of World War II.²⁴⁹ The coalition forces invaded Kuwait and Iraq on February 24th. In just four days, they defeated the Iraqi military and liberated Kuwait. U.S. losses in the war were 148 dead.²⁵⁰ The Pentagon estimated that 100,000 Iraqi soldiers and 5,000 civilians lost their lives during the war.²⁵¹ Iraq agreed to UN peace terms. However, Iraq has consistently attempted to frustrate the enforcement of those terms, especially UN arms inspections. President commented before the war that "This will not be another Vietnam. This will not be a protracted, drawn out war. If one American soldier has to go into battle, that soldier will have enough

²⁴⁹ Dilip Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War*, (New York: Routledge, Chapman, and Hall Inc., 1992), 4.

²⁵⁰ Theodore Draper, "The True History of the Gulf War," *The New York Review*, 30 January 1992, 38.

²⁵⁰ Robert Art, "The Gulf War in Retrospect," (Buffalo: University of Buffalo, 1993), 42.

²⁵¹ Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, *The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), 74-75.

behind him to win and then get out.”²⁵²

Operation Desert Storm

In 1991, Desert Storm rejected the idea of limited war and returned to the traditional American approach to war and achieved clear military victory.²⁵³ Gray makes the point the U.S. has been most successful when it used a strategy of brute force in war.²⁵⁴ However, this reveals that the U.S. was “stronger in battle than wise in war.” He posits that American strategists only learned only part of the strategic failures of Vietnam. They only learned to set achievable military objectives. What they failed to do was to “select military goals compatible with political victory.”²⁵⁵ Perhaps the reason for this is because Clausewitz’s theory is more concerned with military victory during the war than it is with achieving political victory, which is applicable after the war.

When Desert Storm was fought; the American public was clearly behind the military. During the conflict, there were many references to the phrase, “This is the first time since World War II that....” This was for good reason since the military was able to use almost unlimited force to destroy the enemy. The U.S.-led forces went directly for the enemy’s jugular, in Clauswitzian terms his “center of gravity”. The U.S.-coalition planners identified three Iraqi centers of gravity. First, the command, control, and leadership of the Iraqi regime were identified. Second, degrading Iraq’s capability to use weapons of mass destruction was critical to preventing their use

²⁵² Hoffman, 83

²⁵³ Gray, *Weapons Don't Make War*, 175.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 4.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 5.



against neighboring states. Third, eliminating the Republican Guard in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations as an effective combat force.²⁵⁶ In just four days, they defeated the Iraqi military and liberated Kuwait. U.S. losses in the war were 148 dead.²⁵⁷ The Pentagon estimated that 100,000 Iraqi soldiers and 5,000 civilians lost their lives during the war.²⁵⁸ Iraq agreed to UN peace terms. However, Iraq has consistently attempted to frustrate the enforcement of those terms, especially UN arms inspections.

Decision to go to War

In March of 1990, the West discovered that Iraq was attempting to smuggle in devices that could trigger nuclear weapons. Shortly after, piping for an Iraqi super-gun was also intercepted.²⁵⁹ From these discoveries rose a call from the

²⁵⁶ Paul Wolfowitz, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 72.

²⁵⁷ Draper, 38.

²⁵⁸ Art, 42.

²⁵⁹ Tucker, 74-75.

²⁵⁹ Roland Dannreuther, *The Gulf Conflict: A Political and Strategic Analysis*, (Riverside, N.J.: Adelphi

international community for economic sanctions against Saddam. In response to the West's allegations that Iraq was designing weapons of mass destruction, Saddam warned the West not to allow Israel to make a preemptive strike against his nuclear plants or he would use chemical weapons to destroy half of the Jewish state. This was a reference to the 1981 Israeli preemptive strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. He further demanded that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait forgive him \$30 billion in debts because of the over-production of oil by OPEC. When the price of oil dropped from \$18 to \$14 a barrel by July of 1990, Saddam specifically blamed Kuwait for over production. He stated that this was the equivalent of military aggression against Iraq.²⁶⁰ Iraq began massing troops along the Kuwaiti border all summer. By late July, he had 100,000 troops on the Kuwaiti border. President Mubarak of Egypt went to Iraq to confer with Saddam and was assured that he had no intention of invading Kuwait.²⁶¹ King Faud of Saudi Arabia was also assured that Iraq would not attack Kuwait.²⁶² Not even Israel correctly guessed Iraq's intentions.

Because the U.S. was not expecting the attack, the U.S. decision-makers overlooked the intelligence that they had. The decision-makers expectations governed their perception of the facts before them. As for Saddam, why would he have expected such a strong response from a nation whose leader was trying to prevent its Congress from implementing economic sanctions for his threats.²⁶³ This was a clear case where deterrence failed due to the lack of understanding of intent

Paper 264, Winter 1991/1992), 14.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 18.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, 19.

²⁶³ Art, 2-3.

by both adversaries compounded by their lack of attention to the clear message that the threat or use of force demonstrates.

If the U.S. had wanted good relations with Iraq, what were its justifications now for going to war? There were many reasons that justified America's decision to go to war. First, the U.S. wanted to obey the charter of the United Nations and enforce its nine resolutions. Second, there was the need to oppose Iraq's invasion and occupation as a violation of sovereignty.²⁶⁴ Bush declared on August 5th that 'this aggression would not stand.'²⁶⁵ Third, the U.S. was concerned about the destruction of the balance of power in the region.²⁶⁶ Iraq could become a regional hegemon and threaten other states with aggression if it was not held in check. If Iraq were allowed to continue to gain from its aggression, it would become stronger, and more difficult to contain. Forth, oil was a significant factor because of its economic implications. If Saddam controlled 40% of the worlds known stocks, he could eventually have the ability to greatly influence the price of oil.²⁶⁷ Shortly after the invasion, Bush declared the Saudi oilfields a "vital national interest."²⁶⁸ Fifth, there was the strong possibility that Iraq would use its chemical weapons and obtain biological and nuclear weapons unless forced to stop.²⁶⁹ Whether Saddam could gain this capability in one or ten years is less important than the fact that it was highly likely he would use these weapons. After all, he had used chemical weapons on his own people.

²⁶⁴ Marcia Lynn Whicker, James Pfiffner, and Raymond A. Moore. *The Presidency and the Gulf War*, (Westport: Praeger Press, 1993), 94.

²⁶⁵ Dannreuther, 25.

²⁶⁶ Whicker, 94.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 95.

²⁶⁸ Dannreuther, 24.

Critics of the war list several reasons why the U.S. should not have gone to war against Iraq. First, the inconclusive end to the war left the U.S. with a permanent enemy that we would have to continue to deal with on a long-term basis.²⁷⁰ Second, the U.S. had no moral grounds to defend a country whose values it rejected. Kuwait was not a free, democratic state. Kuwait had done little to merit the good will of Americans. Kuwait was accustomed to blaming the U.S. for everything that ailed the Arab world. In the UN, the Kuwaitis had consistently expressed nastily toward the U.S.²⁷¹ Third; the war was unjust in that it demonstrated a lack of regard for proportionality in the use of force.²⁷² This is verified by coalition commander General Schwartzkopf who summed up his emotions during the war by quoting General Sherman who said, "War is the remedy our enemy has chosen; therefore, let them have as much of it as they want."²⁷³

The Bush administration felt that they had to pursue the war option instead of using other means because time was against them. There were three reasons that support this belief. First, economic sanctions showed no signs of accomplishing the objectives of the UN resolutions. Although the severity of the economic sanctions on Iraq would virtually cripple the country's economy, they still would not force Iraq to give in.²⁷⁴ Second, the longer the crisis dragged on; the more likely Saddam was to obtain nuclear weapons. Third, the U.S. could not politically afford to keep so many troops in the Middle East for an extended period. This was due to the general Arab

²⁶⁹ Whicker, 96.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., 125.

²⁷¹ Draper, 38.

²⁷² Whicker, 126.

²⁷³ Draper, 38.

²⁷³ Art, 42.

distrust of our intentions.²⁷⁵

Clausewitzian Strategy of Decisive Force

The U.S.-led forces went directly for the enemy's jugular, in Clausewitzian terms his "center of gravity". The U.S.-coalition planners identified three Iraqi centers of gravity. First, were the command, control, and leadership of the Iraqi regime. If Saddam was unable to direct his military forces or maintain internal control, then Iraq might be compelled to comply with Coalition demands. Second, degrading Iraq's capability to use weapons of mass destruction was critical to preventing their use against neighboring states. Third, eliminating the Republican Guard in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations as an effective combat force. This would reduce Iraq's ability to adequately defend Kuwait or pose an offensive threat to the region later.²⁷⁶

The National Military Policy Objectives were identified in US Central Command's Mission Statement for the operation. They were: 1) Neutralize Iraqi National Command Authority, 2) Eject Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait, 3) Destroy the Republican Guard, 4) Destroy Iraq's Ballistic Missile and NBC capability, and 5) Assist in the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait.²⁷⁷ Two additional objectives, which were expressed by Bush prior to Operation Desert Shield, were protecting American citizens abroad and maintaining stability within the region.²⁷⁸ Therefore, the war would call for the "use of overwhelming force in a measured

²⁷⁴ Tucker, 101.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 83.

²⁷⁶ Wolfowitz, 72.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 73.

²⁷⁸ Summers, *On Strategy II*, 173.

manner to achieve straightforward, albeit limited, victory over the invading army.”²⁷⁹

Gray proposes that the U.S. “persuaded itself that the Iraqi center of gravity was its organized military power rather than its over-centralized political leadership.” Even though a military victory of staggering proportions was obtained, subsequent have revealed that the Iraq’s true center of gravity was Saddam Hussein himself. Therefore, the war actually had left much unresolved.²⁸⁰ In appreciation of President Bush’s dilemma, it is fair to point out that he did not want to illegitimatize the victory by further mass killing of helpless Iraqis, nor did he want to assume the responsibility for administrating a totally defeated Iraq. However, the fact remains that the US overestimated Saddam’s political vulnerability and did not achieve a satisfactory political outcome.²⁸¹ To put it another way, “the campaign was decisive in military terms only. The results, from both the air and ground phases, were dramatically decisive at the tactical and operational levels of warfare” and not at the strategic or national level.²⁸²

War Termination

Another important issue is whether the U.S. achieved the goals it set out to accomplish and why the U.S. ended the war when it did? On February 27, 1991, Bush declared that the U.S. military objectives of the war had been met and declared victory.²⁸³ Facing criticism after the war for not pushing forward to occupy Iraq, Schwarzkopf explained his rationale for not doing so. “If it had been our

²⁷⁹ Hoffman, 89.

²⁸⁰ Gray, *Weapons Don't Make War*. 153.

²⁸¹ Ibid., 213-214.

²⁸² Hoffman, 92.

²⁸³ Hiro, 391.

intention to take Iraq, if it had been our intention to destroy the country, if it had been our intention to overrun the country, we could have done it unopposed, for all intents and purposes, from this position at that time. But that was never our intention. Our intention was purely to eject the Iraqis out of Kuwait and to destroy the military power that had come in here."²⁸⁴ If that was the case, then why did the U.S. stop short of overthrowing Saddam's regime?

Near the end of the ground campaign, Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell had a conversation where they determined that all their military objectives had been met and decided to pursue a cessation of hostilities. As President Bush stated at the end of the war, "Iraq's army is defeated. Our military objectives are met...."²⁸⁵ The failure to properly identify military objectives that would lead to a better peace is exhibited by the fact that Sadaam is still in power and the U.S. has had to continue to use military force to check his power. It was improperly assumed that destroying the listed centers of gravity would result in a favorable outcome. Recent activity in the region demonstrates that this is not the case. This demonstrates a weakness in over reductionism in Clausewitz's theory by attempting to determine the center of an enemy's gravity without having any other means to prove this relationship beyond that of proof in battle.

There were many justifications for stopping the war when we did which could have been predicted. First, our three primary allies in the region, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey did not want us to march to Baghdad. The Saudis did not want the Iraqi Shiites to be susceptible to the influence of the Iranian Shiites. Egypt

²⁸⁴ Summers, in *On Strategy II*, 275-276.

feared a resurgence of fundamentalism would cause even more unrest in the region. Turkey did not want an independent Kurdish state effecting the Kurds in its country.²⁸⁶ Turkey and Syria would have seen an independent state as a threat to their internal security.²⁸⁷

Second, there were huge difficulties seen in an occupation. An effective occupation would be long, difficult, and costly.²⁸⁸ It would have been extremely difficult, as well as costly, to rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure that had been destroyed in the war.²⁸⁹ Third, the U.S. had to be careful about its military objectives in the war. Many Arabs held the belief that the U.S. had not given up its imperial ambitions in the region. Forth, there was the perception that shortly after occupation a period of Iraqi internal opposition would start. This would result in mounting casualties over a lengthy period with no exit strategy in site.²⁹⁰ Fifth, if Iraq had broken into three republics, there would have been no state powerful enough to balance the interests of Iran. Therefore, the end-state of the war would not have brought the regional balance of power to the desired equilibrium. It would have encouraged Iran to use aggressive action against these smaller states to increase its power.

Critics of the manner in which the war ended make many points that can be discounted. First, they point out that once at war, a state has the obligation to establish the conditions under which a durable peace can be established.²⁹¹ Second, opponents of the war point out that the U.S. had portrayed the struggle, as

²⁸⁵ Ibid., 176.

²⁸⁶ Art, 23.

²⁸⁷ Tucker, 149.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., 23.

²⁸⁹ Art, 24.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., 146-147.

good against evil yet did nothing to help the Kurd or Shiites. To standby and watch the Iraqi Army crush the rebellions reduced the moral grounds for the war.²⁹² Third, not marching to Baghdad was morally damaging, especially after Bush had called for the people of Iraq overthrow Saddam, yet stood by and watched as the Iraqi Army crushed their rebellion. Forth, critics of the destruction of the Iraq infrastructure point out that these facilities were a necessity for the health of the civilian population. Their destruction as military targets does not dispel the fact that their destruction caused a huge amount of suffering, especially of women and children.²⁹³ Fifth, none of the disputes between Iraq and Kuwait were settled. The issues involving the borders, the islands, the Ramaila oil fields still remain unresolved.²⁹⁴

Public Support for Casualties

The amount of public support for the war was impressive from the standpoint that it was the first time in 40 years that such a level had been achieved without reference to a communist threat. Perhaps this was because there were many important U.S. interests at state.²⁹⁵ Once the air war began, almost eight out of ten Americans were in favor of the war.²⁹⁶ Of course, few expected that Saddam would remain in power.²⁹⁷ As previously noted, the ground war ended quickly with relatively few American casualties. Very few acknowledged that the conflict would go on for the rest of the decade with little end in sight.

Lessons for US Strategy

²⁹¹ Ibid., 142.

²⁹² Ibid., 9.

²⁹³ Draper, 39.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 44.

²⁹⁵ Larson, 30.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., 34.

The Persian Gulf War showed that high technology weapons work and are worth their cost. Doubts raised before the war were put to rest by their overwhelming superior performance.²⁹⁸ This demonstrates a significant military advantage for the U.S. and explains why we have spent so much money on developing superior arms. It also revealed the significant technological advantage enjoyed by the industrial base of the U.S. This was evident in the ability of the nation's industrial base to make hundreds of improvements and modification to weapons in order to adapt to the conditions of the Arabian Peninsula and improve their performance.²⁹⁹ This often overlooked basis of power is important in explaining how America's economic industrial base can be translated into increased military capability on the battlefield and in diplomatic circles.

The Gulf War gave rise to the perception that air power is the decisive form of modern warfare and gave the U.S. a clear advantage over its adversaries.³⁰⁰ Supporters of air power claimed that 25% of the Iraqi armor was destroyed by air power greatly facilitating the ground attack.³⁰¹ Whether air power really is decisive will be debated for decades in military circles; however, the fact that it was 'perceived' by other nations as decisive is relevant for realism. This perceived reality of air dominance would boost U.S. prestige and add to its capability to deter. This predicts that U.S. diplomats will have more leverage and credibility by threatening force during negotiations than would otherwise be the case.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 35.

²⁹⁸ Bobby R. Inman, Joseph S. Nye Jr., William J. Perry, and Roger K. Smith, "Lessons from the Gulf War," (Washington D.C.: *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1992), 68.

²⁹⁹ McCausland, 64-65.

³⁰⁰ Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1994, 109.

³⁰¹ Ibid., 111.

Most importantly, the myth that the Vietnam War crippled the ability of the U.S. to use its military power was demolished. The ghost of Vietnam had finally been buried.³⁰² The conflict eliminated the doubt that the U.S. could effectively employ its military power. This established tremendous American credibility for the use of military capability. However, the victory was so lopsided that there is the danger that diplomats do not understand the human cost inherent in war.

³⁰² Tucker, 152.

CHAPTER 6

THE DOMESTIC LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGY: OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

The main question, which I will attempt to answer in this chapter, is how can military strategy best achieve its objects while maintaining support on the domestic front? Implicit in this question is the idea that the theoretical foundation of military professionals has an impact on the policy adapted for use. In the case of war, this policy takes the form of military strategy. In pursuing this question, I will first explain the "two-level game approach," which I will use to underpin my analysis. Then, I will define military strategy. Next, I will describe the current theoretical basis for U.S. military strategy. Finally, I will analyze Operation Restore Hope in Somalia as a historical event to determine if the most effective military strategy was employed. I will argue that although decisive military force provides the best theoretical foundation for developing strategy, it was not employed throughout the operation due to domestic constraints placed on the Clinton administration.

The Two-level Game Approach

Many might view this topic as simply a case for analysis with international relations theory. However, as Putnam points out, "Domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entangled, but our theories have not yet

sorted out the puzzling tangle."³⁰³ He continues by saying, "The most portentous development in the fields of comparative politics and international relations in recent years is the dawning recognition...of the need to take into account entanglements between the two."³⁰⁴ His purpose is to attempt to create an approach that moves "beyond the mere observation that domestic factors influence international affairs and vice versa, and beyond simple catalogs of instances of such influence, to seek theories that integrate both spheres."³⁰⁵ Using Putnam's theoretical approach, we would not stop at determining the best military strategy to achieve results in war, but whether such a strategy is possible to implement given its impact on domestic politics.³⁰⁶

Putnam wrote specifically about the topic of international negotiations. For our purposes, I am substituting this topic with the formulation of U.S. military strategy. Putnam viewed the politics of international negotiations (or in our case military strategy), in terms of a two-level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue the government and the military to adopt favorable policies. At the international level, the government and the military seek to maximize their ability to destroy the enemy's forces (given our current theoretical framework) while minimizing U.S. casualties. Putnam points out that neither of the two levels can be ignored.³⁰⁷

The complexity of such an approach is that "moves that are rational for a

³⁰³ Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," *International Organization*, Summer 1988, 427.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 459.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., 433.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., 428.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., 434.

player at one board...may be impolitic for that same player at the other board."

However, there are incentives for players to be consistent between their two games.³⁰⁸ Putnam uses the idea of "win-sets" to explain how the players can attempt to develop strategies, which will be acceptable on both tables.³⁰⁹ A win-set is the course that will be acceptable play at both tables.

Operation Restore Hope

As Stevenson put it, "Nothing went wrong in the Gulf War. Plenty went wrong in Somalia."³¹⁰ The end of the Cold War was supposed to usher in what President Bush called a "New World Order," which sprung from the "hopes for a New World based on a shared commitment among nations." The key element in this order would be "the ability and willingness of the United States...to lead international efforts to combat threats to peace and security."³¹¹ However, it soon became apparent that the U.S. was not willing to take the leadership role in "marshaling forces for multilateral interventions."³¹² In fact, Bush only agreed to send forces to Somalia after he had lost his bid for a second term. Furthermore, despite Clinton's claim of "assertive multilateralism," he was no more of a leader and withdrew U.S. forces from Somalia when U.S. casualties increased.³¹³

In 1992, Somalia was a leading candidate for humanitarian intervention. The Red Cross estimated that 75% of the Somali's 4.5 million, were in danger of

³⁰⁸ Ibid., 434.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., 435.


³¹⁰ Jonathan Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 137.

³¹¹ Ivan Daalder, "The United States and Military Intervention in Internal Conflict." in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Michael E. Brown, ed., (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), 461.

³¹² Daalder, "The United States and Military Intervention in Internal Conflict," 463.

³¹³ Ibid., 463.

starvation. Terrible pictures of starving babies catered to the American publics



"taste for melodrama and its sense of noblesse oblige."³¹⁴ The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested in 1992 that the military could perform a military intervention in Somalia to relieve the famine there. Initially, decisive force was used as almost 30,000 troops were deployed on a limited mission to secure supply routes for delivery of food to the starving population. Eventually, other countries contributed 13,000 troops to the operation as well.³¹⁵

It was assumed that the mission would only take a few months and that it would not involve disarming the factions involved in the civil war.³¹⁶ Therefore, Operation Restore Hope did fit the U.S. military's theoretical foundations for the use of decisive force, clear and obtainable objectives, and an early exit.³¹⁷ The plan developed was based on the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, using overwhelming force,

³¹⁴ Stevenson, xii.

³¹⁵ John M. Shalikashvili, "Operations in Somalia," *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), VI-4.

establishing clear and limited objectives, including an exit strategy, and having strong public support at home. This also established the first time that US troops would be participating in a UN peacekeeping force that would follow the US-led UNITAF force.³¹⁸

The Bush administration's line was that the U.S. troops would be gone by January 21.³¹⁹ Bush outlined the mission requirements when he said, "First, we will create a secure environment...so that food can move from ships to the people.... And second, once we have created that environment, we will withdraw our troops, handing the security mission back to a regular UN peacekeeping force."³²⁰ The Americans were initially treated as conquering heroes. When President Bush visited in January 1993, "he was greeted by adoring Somalis." A few days later, "Boutros-Ghali's motorcade was pelted with stones and rotten fruit and denied access to UN headquarters during his visit to Mogadishu."³²¹ General Powell characterized the mission in this way. "It's sort of like the cavalry coming to the rescue, straightening things out for awhile and then letting the marshals come back to keep things under control."³²² Of course, in this case, the marshals never showed up. U.S. special envoy Robert Oakley reiterated the U.S. mission when he said, "Our mission is not to take over the responsibility for the security of this country."³²³

³¹⁶ Daalder, "The United States and Military Intervention in Internal Conflict," 474.

³¹⁷ Ibid., 475.

³¹⁸ Robert B. Oakley, "Somalia Case Study," Patterson School Symposium (FiFi), 4.

³¹⁹ Stevenson, xii.

³²⁰ William J. Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy: Intervention in Somalia," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, William J. Durch ed., (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 320.

³²¹ Stevenson, 48.

³²² Ibid., 51.

³²³ Ibid., 56.

Mission Creep

When the UN's UNOSOM took over from UNITAF from March 1993 to May 1993, it was expected that it would take at least two years to rebuild Somalia's infrastructure.³²⁴ On May 4, 1993, Marine Lieutenant General Johnston gave command of UN forces to General Bir, a Muslim Turk.³²⁵ Major General Montgomery was the UN's second-in-command. However, it was U.S. retired Admiral Howe who ended up with the real control in military operations.³²⁶ Within weeks of UNOSOM II taking control, the nation-building mission was going badly off track.³²⁷

The initial policy was expanded in March 1993, when President Clinton supported the Security Council's passing of Resolution 814, which called for nation building and pacification in Somalia. UN ambassador Madeleine Albright said that this new goal was "nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community of nations." This started a "two-track approach," with U.S. military pacification and UN sponsored reconciliation.³²⁸ Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, was uncomfortable with "accelerating the disparity between the two tracks and turned down Montgomery's requests for tanks, artillery, and AC-130 Specter gunships."³²⁹ It is universally agreed that such support could have turned the tide on the night of October 3rd and was certainly more in line with the American view of decisive force. When the administration decided toward the

³²⁴ Jonathon T. Howe, "Somalia: Frustration in a Failed Nation." in *Soldiers for Peace*, Barbara Benton ed., (New York: Facts on File Inc., 1996), 162.

³²⁵ Stevenson, xiii.

³²⁶ Ibid., 52.

³²⁷ Daalder, "Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping," 49.

³²⁸ Ibid., 104.

end of September 1993 to de-emphasize military operations in favor of political initiatives, it failed to get the word to the troops in Somalia.³³⁰

On June 5, 1993, Aideed's military killed and mutilated twenty-four Pakistani soldiers next to his radio station. A month later, his men stoned to death three journalists and shot a fourth. As a result, Howe put a bounty on Aideed's head.³³¹ Howe blames the Aideed for undermining the efforts of UNOSOM II's mission by his brutal attack on June 5th.³³² As he said, "We knew of the dangers of a protracted struggle, but the consequences of not responding to these vicious attacks seemed worse than the risks of taking action."³³³ After a major attack by US gunships on July 12, killed 40 members of Aideed's militia, it was all-out war for Aideed against US forces. Many Somalis now began to see the US as foreign, infidel invaders and helped unite support for Aideed.³³⁴

By late-1993, the mission had gone severely off track.³³⁵ The battle on October 3 was "the bloodiest single combat episode involving U.S. casualties since Vietnam--worse than anything in the Gulf War."³³⁶ Thirty Americans had lost their lives in battle to the warlords. The lessons of Mogadishu would be added to that of Vietnam and Lebanon as reasons for the military not to intervene in internal conflicts. With the images of dead Rangers being drug through the streets of Mogadishu being shown on every television set in America, Clinton faced a real crisis. He could

³²⁹ Ibid., 105.

³³⁰ Durch, 327.

³³¹ Stevenson, xiii.

³³² Ibid., 165.

³³³ Ibid., 169.

³³⁴ Oakley, 22.

³³⁵ Daalder, "The United States and Military Intervention in Internal Conflict," 475.

³³⁶ Stevenson, xiv.

escalate the war and risk further failure or he could withdraw and declare peace.

Like in Vietnam, the U.S. set a timetable for its pull out and implicitly certified Aideed as the military victor, arousing a sense of nationalism in the Somalis.³³⁷

No More Somalias!

In the future, US intervention in peacekeeping operations would be different. The reluctance to intervene was encapsulated in Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25). PDD-25 legitimized the influence that the domestic forces would have on the formation of military policy. It emphasized time limits on peacekeeping operations, shared burdened with other UN members, U.S. command and control of its forces in multilateral operations, and a deliberate concentration on the importance of consultation with the Congress and the public. All these factors have helped to shape future intervention efforts.³³⁸ The military's input to this document is clearly seen in its reliance on decisive force doctrine. PDD – 25 emphasized that the role of the military was “to protect US national interests by deterring, and, if necessary, fighting and winning wars.” Peacekeeping operations would be “more selective and more effective” in the future.³³⁹

PDD-56 was developed to take effect in managing complex contingency operations.³⁴⁰ It requires that a political-military implementation plan be developed as an integrated planning tool for coordinating such operations. The overall intent is

³³⁷ Ibid., 102.

³³⁸ Daalder, “The United States and Military Intervention in Internal Conflict,” 481.

³³⁹ Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping,” 58.

³⁴⁰ William J. Clinton, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive – 56, White Paper, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 1.

to direct centralized planning and decentralized execution.³⁴¹ It explicitly includes many of the requirements requested by the military including specified clear and obtainable objectives, desired end state to be achieved, an exit strategy, and U.S. interests.³⁴²

Theoretical Analysis of Domestic Constraints

The obvious question is how can we explain why the U.S. changed its strategy in Somalia after it had achieved initial success there? Using our theoretical approach, we can explain this turn around on two levels. These are the domestic and international levels or games. We have already discussed many of the issues at the international level. At the domestic level, the main elements involved were public opinion, Congress, and the military. For the military to adopt a strategy, it has to be in the "win-set" not only on the battlefield, but on the domestic front as well. As we will discuss, domestic issues constrained the "win-set" of the military at the domestic game-level, forcing a withdrawal of troops.

Initially, UNITAF was a large success domestically. Polls at the time indicated that 81% of Americans agreed that the US was doing the right thing in sending troops to Somalia and 70% believed the mission was worth risking American lives.³⁴³ An indicator of events to come was that only 44% believed that US troops should stay in Somalia until the country was pacified.³⁴⁴ With pictures of dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by mobs of triumphant Somalis appeared on every American television set, the domestic

³⁴¹ Ibid., 4.

³⁴² Ibid., 7.

³⁴³ Durch, 320.

reaction was swift.³⁴⁵

However, critics point out that contrary to conventional wisdom, the U.S. public will support U.S. intervention in internal conflicts, but only under certain conditions.³⁴⁶ Domestic support can be created as a result of the sympathy of the victims of conflict as viewed on television. This support for action can sometimes lead to pressure to do something to help.³⁴⁷ While initial public opinion as expressed to congressional offices was clearly for the withdrawal of U.S. troops, only 41% of those polled wanted an immediate withdrawal from Somalia. Furthermore, a clear majority supported Clinton's temporary increase of troops.³⁴⁸ Usually for the public to maintain its support, the UN must sanction the intervention.³⁴⁹ Second, there must be a clearly defined humanitarian objective, which does not include ending a civil war. This was the case in Somalia when 82% of the public supported Bush's initial deployment and 46% thought it was a mistake to try to end the civil war there. Finally, there must be a commitment to act decisively and quickly.³⁵⁰

Congress was another factor that has to be dealt with in the formulation of military strategy. In cases where the vital interests of the U.S. are at stake, they usually will defer to the president. However, when the UN, peacekeeping, and military involvement are an issue, they become very interested. The effect of Congress in the case of Somalia was to constrain the executive branch, to include

³⁴⁴ Ibid., 320.

³⁴⁵ Daalder, "Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping," 56.

³⁴⁶ Daalder, "The United States and Military Intervention in Internal Conflict," 468.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 466.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., 328.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., 467.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., 467.

the military, freedom of action.³⁵¹

Senator Byrd questioned the presence of U.S. forces in Somalia when most of the public had already lost interest. Few in civilian leadership positions were paying attention to developments there. Eventually, even the press got tired of the on-scene horror, "You've seen one starving child, you've seen 'em all."³⁵² When four U.S. soldiers were killed in August 1993, while fighting warlord Mohammed Aideed, Byrd urged for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces.³⁵³ Congress threatened to cut-off funding for US forces in Somalia if they were not withdrawn.³⁵⁴ Public support began to wane and turned against the Somali mission. On October 3, 1993, when seventeen Army Rangers were killed in a raid on Aideed's headquarters, public and congressional reaction called for the immediate withdrawal of troops. With the public determining a large hand in the development of the strategy, the troops were withdrawn within six months.³⁵⁵

In the aftermath of the October 3 battle, Aideed's losses of at least 500 killed and many more wounded had a sobering impact on his sub-clan. Many of his supporters expressed the idea that they had paid too high a cost in blood to support Aideed and were ready to work for peace.³⁵⁶ However, the similarities to the Tet Offensive in 1968 are striking. Howe said, "The shock of losing so many fine U.S. soldiers, the sickening mutilation and parading of bodies before television cameras...caused outrage and revulsion in the U.S." This tragedy instead of

³⁵¹ Ibid., 464.

³⁵² Stevenson, 40.

³⁵³ Daalder, "The United States and Military Intervention in Internal Conflict," 479.

³⁵⁴ Ibid., 476.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., 479.

³⁵⁶ Howe, 176.

revoking a stronger war effort response led to intensified domestic criticism of prolonged participation in the mission.³⁵⁷ As he put it, "The rescue of the Somali people was deemed unworthy of another American life."³⁵⁸ Although few Americans would have recognized a vital interest in Somalia, roughly 75% of the public approved of the initial humanitarian mission because of the vast benefits of saving hundreds of thousands of starving Somalis.³⁵⁹ However, because the prospects for success had decreased as the perceived cost rose above what the Americans had been willing to support.³⁶⁰

Views within the military also had a great impact on this domestic game-level. Within the military, there was substantial opposition to its use in military interventions where it was not capable of using decisive force. The military's perspective was shaped mainly by their experiences in World War II, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. America's victory in World War II imbued its military leaders in some ways to feel a false sense of infallibility. This led to "professional arrogance, lack of imagination, and moral and intellectual insensitivity" among the military leadership. As Stevenson put it, "The Gulf War understandably delivered the rebirth of American triumphalism, but with it came the same negative by-products in the military: a misplaced ascription of omnipotence, an oversimplified formula for military success, and an under-appreciation for the operational ramifications of unfamiliar turf."³⁶¹

Vietnam demonstrated how the public's support would gradually turn negative

³⁵⁷ Ibid., 177.

³⁵⁸ Ibid., 177.

³⁵⁹ Larson, 43.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., 45.

³⁶¹ Stevenson, 103.

as the conflict continued on with no end in sight, little hope of victory, and mounting casualties. All these led the American public to question the utility of the war and resulted in massive demonstrations. A general anti-military ethos was pervasive throughout society toward the end of the conflict and for many years afterward. To put it gently, the public's negative views of its service were not desirable by those leading the military. They spent years rebuilding the military and preparing it for decisive battle under the Clauswitzian framework. Using these forces to participate in peace operations was, in the military's view, inviting failure on the battlefield and at home.

As military planners faced continuing, declining budgets, they viewed humanitarian missions as distracting from their primary mission of being prepared to fight and win two major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously.³⁶² Furthermore, involvement in internal conflicts was a type of war which U.S. military leaders had sought to avoid after their experiences in Vietnam and Lebanon. Situations where military objectives were not clear or obtainable and where limited forces were deployed could lead to an endless quagmire where they would more than likely lose domestic support. The Persian Gulf War was the antithesis of this approach to war and more on line with the military's theoretical foundation. As Daalder put it, "decisive force was employed in support of a clear objective and applied in overwhelming fashion, in order to minimize casualties and allow for a quick exit of U.S. forces."³⁶³

³⁶² Ibid., 464.

³⁶³ Ibid., 464.

Domestic Politics Conclusion

The argument of this chapter is not that U.S. intervention was a failure. In fact, it was far from that. Conservative estimates are that the UNITAF operations saved over 250,000 Somali lives.³⁶⁴ Using the "two-level game approach," we have analyzed the operation in terms of the military strategy used by the U.S. Initially, the U.S. used a strategy that employed the deployment of decisive force. However, due to constraints imposed at the "domestic game-level," the U.S. was forced to abandon this successful strategy and withdraw its forces. As Daalder put it, "The Clinton administration's policy toward multilateral peace operations was based on a realistic appraisal of what the U.S. domestic political system could bear."³⁶⁵ A solution to situations like this was offered by former U.S. special envoy in Somalia Robert Oakley. His advice was not to get too involved in other country's political and social problems. However, if the U.S. decides to intervene, the government must first explain to Congress and the public the degree of support needed both in the target country and at home.³⁶⁶ As for the military, "the firefight in Mogadishu has served to reinforce the concept of Decisive Force and its applicability to humanitarian missions as well. The example of Somalia, one could argue, vindicates the Decisive Force concept."³⁶⁷

³⁶⁴ Shalikhshvili, "Operations in Somalia," VI-7.

³⁶⁵ Daalder, "The United States and Military Intervention in Internal Conflict," 483.

³⁶⁶ Oakley, 25.

³⁶⁷ Hoffman, 105

CONCLUSION

The focus of this work was to view the use of U.S. military force as a political instrument in order to secure political objectives. I proposed that such force might or may not result in battle casualties depending on the type of strategy employed. By using decisive force and Fabian military strategy as examples, I have illustrated important elements of the comparative method and demonstrated how my study was conducted. I have argued how it could be possible to invalidate Clausewitz's dictum that battle is the only means to achieve success in war. As Clausewitz put it, "Essentially war is fighting, for fighting is the only effective principle in the many fold activities generally designated as war."³⁶⁸ Clausewitz summarizes his line of argument favoring decisive battle by giving us a statement that was used by many generals in World War I to justify large casualties.

We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms.³⁶⁹

Representing the Fabian approach, Hart would argue that the true aim of the strategist "is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a

³⁶⁸ Clausewitz, 127.

battle is sure to achieve this.”³⁷⁰ Hart reminds us that the overall purpose for pursuing this approach is because “the object in war is to attain a better peace--even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.”³⁷¹

Evidence for using a Fabian approach was demonstrated in the U.S. intervention in Haiti. In Operation Uphold Democracy, the maneuver of military forces brought about an almost bloodless strategic outcome. This strategy relied on the idea that the reduction of casualties on both sides would lead to establishing a better peace. As I demonstrated in the other case studies, this approach is inconsistent with the dominant preference of the U.S. military for the use of decisive force in achieving results.

In Panama, the evolution of decisive force doctrine in the U.S. military was tested. This evolution was a result of the lessons of the Vietnam War. The U.S. achieved great success at securing military objectives by employing massive, simultaneous force quickly into the theater of operations. However, this success did not fully translate into securing the political objective of establishing a functioning democratic government. The purely political objectives tended to be overlooked in lieu of traditional military objectives.

The Gulf War demonstrated to the U.S. military that the decisive force doctrine was viable. The military achieved tremendous results by using overwhelming combat power to destroy the Iraqi centers of gravity. However, their

³⁶⁹ Hart, *Strategy*, 260.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., 339.

³⁷¹ Ibid., 366.

objectives were primarily military and did not result in establishing a lasting peace in the region. It could even be argued that Iraq is using a Fabian strategy of avoidance. Their actions appear to be aimed at seeking to weaken U.S. resolve by avoiding a decisive conventional battle while they are rebuilding their military capabilities. Time will tell which strategy is most effective in that region.

In Somalia, decisive force was used early in the intervention. However, U.S. forces were reduced to give the appearance of an exit strategy. Concurrently, more political objectives were added to the mission. This mismatch of resources came to a head when television images of U.S. Rangers being drug through the streets of Mogadishu led to the withdrawal of U.S. forces. This domestic impact indicated that the public did not support casualties for operations that did not appear to be of a vital national interest. In this case, the military was prevented by domestic and political pressures from using its preferred doctrine of decisive force.

The advantages of the decisive force doctrine are best realized by the military. These are the ability to quickly seize military objectives, reduce casualties to the bare minimum, and sustain high levels of public support. One disadvantage of this approach is a tendency of the military to minimize the importance of what are considered purely political objectives. Another disadvantage is the likelihood that inflicting exceedingly high casualties on the enemy will make it more difficult to develop a long-term peaceful situation at the end of the conflict.

The advantage of using a Fabian Strategy is that it attempts to reduce casualties on both sides of a conflict and focuses on achieving a long-term peaceful solution. Its use demonstrates an attempt to be more flexible in the application of

the use of force. The primary disadvantage is that it exposes the military to higher casualty rates. Another disadvantage is that it does not produce quick results to political problems. Therefore, it is more difficult to sustain domestic support for such a military strategy unless it is of vital importance to the nation.

Despite the possibilities of the less violent use of force, the military has focused on the lessons of using decisive force. These can be summarized by Representative David McCurdy (D-OK), a Vietnam veteran who said:

The one lesson from Vietnam is clear and absolute, and that is the issue of decisive force. It may be a sledge hammer, but if we are going to be in a conflict and going in on the heavy side saves American lives, then we ought to lean that way. I think that's the most significant lesson from Vietnam, in the Gulf and Panama we played to win.³⁷²

Walzer pointed out that the argument of "either fight all-out or not at all" is often viewed as a typically American concept. However, it is actually universal in the history of warfare. Once soldiers are engaged in war, pressure builds to achieve victory through decisive results. Military commanders recognize that the stakes in war are extremely high, especially if the survival of a people is at stake.³⁷³ The possible outcomes can be final in their nature for the state and its people. Because, as Clausewitz pointed out, there are so many unknowns in war, it is more likely for military planners to pursue strategies that make maximum use of all forces available to counteract this idea of friction.

Accordingly, the military will be more likely to focus its actions on mainly military objectives rather than more complex political ones in order to achieve

³⁷² Hoffman, 67.

victory. The threat of losing casualties, and the resulting support of the public, will continue to force military planners to focus on decisive force as the best strategy to pursue. The idea that the resulting enemy casualties may make it more difficult to achieve a lasting peace will be seen by the military as a problem for politicians to solve. Fabian strategies are more likely to be employed by our opponents in order to wear us down and achieve strategic success outside the realms of the battlefield. For these reasons, I believe the U.S. will continue to follow its decisive force doctrine, despite the fact that it tends to produce short-term success at the expense of long-term peaceful solutions.

³⁷³ Ibid., 228.

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